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Abstract:
This essay uses the European Union as a case study to analyze the conditions for an optimal
currency area, the regional differences that give rise to divergences from optimal conditions, and
how to measure divergence. The essay reviews the extensive body of theoretical literature on
optimal currency areas (OCA), analyzes the historical evidence and documents that outline the
economic institutions of the EU, and performs an empirical factor analysis on different possible
indicators of convergence to identify to the most important variables. In the absence of
adjustment mechanisms, economic geography plays an essential role in forming an OCA because
members of a currency area must have similar monetary policy needs. The most important
indicators of convergence towards an optimal currency area include measures of real effective
exchange rates, labor productivity, inflation, and patterns of production.
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Introduction
Monetary unions such as the European Union raise interesting questions about the
structural forces that affect economic performance. Most economic and monetary unions are
associated with nation states that have integrated economies, and they are traditionally
considered the basic units of macroeconomic thought. The United States, Japan, and individual
European countries like the United Kingdom are monetary unions, with a single currency and
monetary policy. The European Union instead developed from a voluntary union of individual
member states, which chose to give up their monetary independence. Their policymakers
designed a monetary union from the ground up, informed by economic thinking about the best
practices for a monetary area. The plans to form a monetary union of European states provoked
intense debates about whether the union was feasible or optimal for its members. The unique
historical development of the European economic and monetary union and the scope of
arguments about its creation present a fascinating case study in the structures of a currency area.
This essay will use the European Union as a case study to analyze the conditions for an
optimal currency area, the regional differences that give rise to divergences from optimal
conditions, and how to measure divergence. The essay will employ three sources of insight: the
extensive body of theoretical literature on optimal currency areas (OCA), the historical evidence
and documents that outline the economic institutions of the EU, and the extensive database of
European statistics that can be analyzed empirically. Using these sources, the essay will answer
the question: To what extent did the creation of the EU reflect the role of structural integration in
an optimal currency union, and how can structural integration be measured?
The essay has three main parts: an overview of the literature on optimal currency area
theory, a theoretical analysis of the EU’s history, founding documents, and where they diverge
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from an optimal currency area, and an empirical factor analysis of how these divergences from
an optimal currency area might be measured.
The literature on optimal currency area theory developed largely from Robert Mundell’s
work in the 1960s. Other scholars then used empirical methods to analyze Mundell’s conclusions
and draw out more precise requirements for an optimal currency area. The review of OCA theory
will identify the essential requirements for an optimal currency area. Then, the theoretical
requirements for an optimal currency area will be compared with the history and economic
institutions of the EU. There is extensive documentation about the debates throughout the 20th
century that gave rise to the EU.
The second part of the essay compares evidence from these debates and from
foundational documents such as the Delors Report and the Treaty of Maastricht against the
requirements of an optimal currency area. The analysis reveals three significant gaps between the
economic conditions and institutions of the EU and the requirements of an OCA.
The final part of the essay will consider how to measure these divergences from optimal
currency area through empirical tools. Because the main challenge is the large number of
different indicators that can be used to measure structural divergences between regions of an
optimal currency area, a factor analysis will be conducted. Factor analysis can identify
correlations between many different variables, and indicate the underlying factors that explain
total variance across the variables. The analysis identifies three main factors that indicate
structural divergence from an optimal currency area: price levels and labor productivity across
regions, real and nominal effective exchange rates, and labor costs. These indicators could be
used to study policy effects on the structure of a currency area. To illustrate one potential
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application, the indicators will be used to evaluate the divergence between Poland and the
Eurozone.
The essay will conclude with some key takeaways about the implications of the EU as a
case study for integration into an optimal currency area. In the absence of adjustment
mechanisms, economic geography plays an essential role because members of a currency area
must have similar monetary policy needs.

5

1: Optimal currency area theories and conditions
There is a large body of evidence on what constitutes an optimal currency area. This
literature originated in the 1960s and has continued to examine how the composition of a
currency area affects its policies and wellbeing. An overview of theories about optimal currency
areas will help to place the EU’s historical policies in context, and to focus the analysis of where
the EU diverges from an optimal currency area. This initial section of the essay will review the
classic theory of optimal currency areas, then move through the more current literature about the
role of asymmetric shocks in the functioning of a currency area, and draw implications for the
case of the EU.
1.1: Overview of currency area theories
During the 1960s, Robert Mundell pioneered a theory of optimal currency areas arguing
that an optimally functioning currency area has to include economic areas that all experience
similar shocks and respond to them in a similar way.1 More recent scholarship has examined
different types of shocks, particularly asymmetric shocks that affect a specific geographical
region or industry sector. A related line of literature studied the divergent effects of monetary
shocks specifically. Finally, analyses focusing on the effect of economic shocks on US states
found that if a monetary union includes disparate economic regions, it can still function
optimally if there are other mechanisms for the regions to adjust. In the case of the United States,
flexible labor markets and federal fiscal transfers allow for adjustment when there are specific
shocks to parts of its economy.2 In the case of the European Union, the lack of adjustment
mechanisms means that the gaps between the design of the EU and OCA theory become

1
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especially important. Where member states have divergent monetary policy needs, the currency
area will become suboptimal and requires strengthening through specific policies. This overview
of OCA theory will help to identify particularly important requirements for an optimal currency
area, which will later be evaluated against the design of the EU.
1.2: Mundell’s optimal currency area theory
Robert Mundell’s theory of optimal currency areas creates a framework to evaluate a
currency area’s effectiveness by the integration of its component economic areas. Mundell’s
work represents one of the earliest analyses of the effective functioning of a currency area.
Mundell observed the shocks to the Bretton Woods monetary system during the 1960s and
formulated a simple intellectual exercise about the functioning of a currency area. According to
this framework, a currency area functions optimally if it covers an appropriate geographical
area.3 Specifically, the geographical area included in the currency area needs to contain
economies that all experience the same economic shocks and react to them in the same way.
Mundell explains this concept through the example of a multi-regional currency area.4 In this
hypothetical example, there are two regions with different patterns of production specializing in
different goods, united under a single currency. One region suffers a negative economic shock
resulting in higher unemployment. The optimal response for monetary policy in this region
would be to pursue inflationary policies and a devaluation of the currency, in order to stimulate
its economy. However, the negatively affected region depends on a national authority for its
monetary policy. If the national monetary authority pursues inflationary policies across the
whole country, then it will help the region which suffered the negative shock, but other regions
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will experience higher inflation than is optimal for them.5 Naturally, the individual regions have
lost the ability to push for a local stimulus by using expansionary monetary policy or
devaluations. For Mundell, uniting the whole world into a single currency area would not be
optimal because it would be too large to function properly. Alternatively, very small regions are
not optimal either because it becomes too difficult to exchange many different currencies
constantly when conducting business across regions. Instead, an optimal currency area needs to
include as many economic regions as possible, but those regions must all experience similar
economic shocks.
The key insight in Mundell’s paper is that for a currency area to be optimal, its members
must have the same monetary policy needs. However, in many cases actual patterns of economic
activity exist within nations or regions in ways that are not necessarily integrated or optimal for
the conduction of monetary policy. An optimal currency area needs to have member parts with
the same optimal monetary policy. If the members of a currency area are nation states, as in the
case of the EU, then those states need to be similar enough that the same monetary policy can be
applied to them with optimal results for output and price levels.6 Mundell’s theory also implies
that the most important determinant of optimal monetary policy is whether it is well suited to the
geographical area which it affects. In particular, there should not be any major structural
discrepancies between the different economic regions or sectors that will be affected. If there are
structural differences then one part of the currency area might have different labor costs,
productivity, or price levels from another part. One region could experience the sort of
deflationary shock that Mundell thought about, while another suffers an inflationary shock. In
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this case a single monetary policy will likely not be optimal for the whole area. Many years later
Mundell commented on the upcoming implementation of the European Monetary Union in
1999.7 He remarked on the need for all the member countries to meet the convergence criteria set
out by the EU. These convergence criteria were intended to ensure exactly the sort of integration
that Mundell considered essential for an optimal currency union. Even though a number of
countries did not meet the convergence criteria for essential indicators like the fiscal deficit, the
plan for integration proceeded. Mundell was optimistic that the core and peripheric countries
were fundamentally not too different.8 However, the debate raised questions about how to
measure the magnitude of structural differences between members of the EU. The question of
measurement will be considered empirically later in this essay. Mundell seems to have backed
the Maastricht criteria, which measured nominal indicators. Much of the literature after Mundell
focused on measuring the types of shocks that affect members of a currency area.
1.3: Evidence from asymmetric shocks
Later studies built on Mundell’s theory of optimal currency areas by studying how
component regions of a currency area respond to shocks. Mundell’s original thought experiment
dealt with a hypothetical shock affecting one economic region but not another within the same
currency union. Therefore, a properly integrated and optimal currency area should have
component regions that do not experience asymmetric shocks that affect one region and not
another. Additionally, if a shock affects the entire currency area, then its component regions
should respond similarly to the shock in order for Mundell’s optimal conditions to hold. These
conditions reveal a more detailed view of the requirements for an optimal currency area. As the
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literature on asymmetric shocks suggests, members of a currency area need to have a
synchronized business cycle and similar economies with compatible patterns of production, in
order to form an optimal currency area.
Barry Eichengreen and Tamim Bayoumi studied the effects of shocks on different
European countries and compared them to shocks in U.S. states.9 The two most important
economic indicators of a shock are logically the output and price level of an economy. There
have been a number of studies about the variation in output and price level between European
countries compared to the United States. In general, these studies found that the European
countries suffered more variable or asymmetric shocks to output and prices than did U.S.
states.10 However, Eichengreen and Bayoumi claimed that studying the behavior of output and
prices may confuse the initial impact of a shock, and the subsequent response of the economy to
the initial shock. Therefore, they use GDP data to attempt to identify long-term supply shocks
and short-term demand shocks to European economies. The authors found that in general,
European economies experience more variable demand and supply shocks than do U.S. regions,
and take significantly longer to adjust to them.11 Comparing the “core” European economies to
the entire U.S., the variability of shocks seems to be similar, but there is a “core” of U.S. regions
with even more synchronized economies. Eichengreen and Bayoumi suggested that the delay in
adjustment could be accounted for by a common policy and full factor mobility, but the
difference in shocks apparently points to structural differences in the economies of European
countries.12 Eichengreen and Bayoumi’s results imply that there is a fundamental mismatch
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between the “core” economies of Europe and the “periphery.” This mismatch could be a result of
different patterns of production, different labor productivities, or some combination.
A later study by the European Parliament conducted a thorough review of different
asymmetric shocks in the context of the EMU, and concluded that European countries experience
more sector specific shocks than country specific shocks.13 Therefore, different economic sectors
are likely to experience asymmetric shocks and if different sectors are prevalent in different
countries or regions, these economies will suffer asymmetric shocks accordingly. The authors
recognized that there are significant region-specific shocks, but argued that some of these would
be smoothed out through expected the process of integration. They also recognized the
significance of different financial structures between European countries, but argued that these
would become less significant with integration, and increased capital mobility would provide
another adjustment mechanism.14
The literature on asymmetric shocks is extremely important because most studies,
including Eichengreen and Bayoumi’s and the European Parliament’s, found that European
countries experienced asymmetric shocks and therefore did not meet Mundell’s criterion for an
optimal currency area. There have been different interpretations about what determines the
presence of these asymmetric shocks. However, it seems clear that there were and are differences
in patterns of production that result in asymmetric shocks. There could be differences in
integration between different geographic regions or between economic sectors. In many cases
there is a relationship between a certain sector which is especially important to a certain region,
so that the region has a fundamentally unique economy that experiences unique shocks.
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Therefore, the study of asymmetric shocks implies that the effectiveness of monetary policy
depends at least in part, on the patterns of production of the economies to which it is being
applied. Moreover, the European countries experienced significant asymmetric shocks before the
creation of the EMU. The prevalence of asymmetric shocks suggests that there were structural
differences between member countries that prevented them from achieving optimal conditions
for a currency area.
Sectoral shocks that affect a specific economic sector, or industry, are types of
asymmetric shocks that challenge even well integrated economies. Some recent academic
literature has explored the ways in which sectoral shocks affect monetary policy. Overall, the
theory about sectoral shocks follows a similar logic to that about regional shocks. If there is a
shock that harms one specific sector of the economy, then optimal monetary policy will be
different for that sector and for the rest of the economy. While the negatively affected sector
would benefit from expansionary monetary policy, other sectors in the economy that are
operating normally might not. Further, monetary policy might have different effects on sectors
because there are different transmission mechanisms towards different sectors. For example,
sectors might respond differently to a change in the interest rate because one sector might have
more frequent investment needs. If a given sector needs to invest more frequently, it is more
sensitive to changes in the interest rate.
In a paper by Raddatz and Rigobon, the evidence suggests that during the 2001-2002 tech
crisis there were sectoral discrepancies in the effects monetary policy.15 The Federal Reserve
lowered interest rates in response to the recession caused by the dot com crash, but the tech
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sector does not seem to have benefitted from the lower interest rates because it has less need for
investment capital. Instead, other sectors such as construction began to experience a rise in
activity and eventually a bubble. Another study found that sectors that produce tradable goods,
such as industrial goods, are more responsive to monetary policy because they are more sensitive
to interest rates.16
These findings have interesting implications for economic integration because a lack of
integration might increase the challenges of sectoral shocks. In a well-integrated economy,
monetary policy might have some inefficiencies across sectors, but ultimately sectors will adjust
to shocks.17 However, a less integrated economy might have trouble adjusting because there is
less mobility across sectors. With greater disparity between sectors, there is more difficulty in
moving labor or other factors of production from one sector to another. In the context of the
European Union, disparities in sectors are to some extent related to regional and national
disparities. Countries within the EU have different patterns of production and significant
differences in the role of particular sectors.18 Therefore, sector specific shocks might have a
similar effect to regional shocks by affecting some countries more severely than others. Without
a large degree of integration, it becomes difficult for countries to adjust to sectoral shocks. It is
also difficult for monetary policy to act effectively without very disparate effects on different
countries.
There is a large body of evidence that monetary policy can have divergent impacts on
different economic sectors, which also result in divergence that is not optimal for a currency
area. Mundell’s optimal currency area theory suggested that in many cases, national monetary
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policy may not be effective for all regions in the area. Similarly, if there are disparate economic
sectors under a single currency area, then a centralized monetary policy may not be efficient for
all of them. In a normal currency area that spans a single nation, such as the USA, disparate
sectoral effects may be smoothed out over time.19 Just like asymmetric regional or sectoral
shocks, a monetary policy with disparate sectoral effects will eventually be resolved through
different adjustment mechanisms. For example, transfers by the federal government,
intermediation by the financial sector, or movements between sectors and regions will eventually
help to balance out asymmetric shocks. However, in a looser currency union like the EU, many
of these adjustment mechanisms are not present. Therefore the disparate effects of monetary
policy could be larger than in the U.S. case, and could aggravate the structural differences
between parts of the currency area. Moreover, even for fully integrated currency areas, it is
relevant to consider the inefficiencies that a monetary policy with divergent effects could have.
A number of studies have explored why different sectors have disparate policy needs. In
an early example by Maisel, the evidence from the 1960s shows that monetary policies had
different effects on the spending of sectors. Spending in the housing sector was especially
affected, presumably because as a sector it is sensitive to changes in the interest rate. Other
sectors that needed to invest to replace equipment also had a greater exposure to interest rate
changes.20 Later studies continued to explore how monetary policy is transmitted differently to
different sectors. One analysis by the Bank of England reinforced the evidence that construction
and manufacturing generally respond faster to a monetary shock than services.21 Therefore, it
might be reasonable to expect that a region or country within a currency area that has a larger
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manufacturing sector will respond differently to a change in monetary policy than a region with a
larger service sector. Finally, there is evidence that smaller firms respond faster to monetary
shocks than large firms.22 These types of disparate effects underscore how differences in regional
and sectoral structures affect the efficiency of monetary policy. Because the member countries
and regions of the European Union have different patterns of production and costs, they
experience very different shocks. These shocks may be asymmetrical changes in supply or
demand, or even monetary shocks. EU policy therefore targeted the adjustment mechanisms that
would let different sectors adjust to these shocks.
1.4: Adjustment mechanisms for asymmetric shocks
A second strand of literature focused on the response to asymmetric shocks and found
that a currency area could still function optimally if its different economic regions adapt to the
shock through labor market adjustments or through fiscal policy. In Mundell’s example, the two
regions have different patterns of production and cannot enact monetary or (to a large extent)
fiscal policies to stabilize their economies. However, Blanchard and Katz claimed in a wellknown paper that the regions might adjust to the shock through labor market movements.23 If
there is high unemployment in one region, then workers will have a strong incentive to just move
to a different region where there is a shortage of labor.24 Blanchard and Katz collected data for
individual U.S. states and then studied the historical time series data for their main indicators like
GDP and employment. The results indicate that there has been wide variation in output and
employment over time throughout different U.S. states. In response to these shocks, states
experienced changes in employment and wages. However, in the long run both employment and
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wages returned to their natural trend. While the unemployment rate returned to its natural level,
however, the actual level of employment changed permanently in response to shocks.25
Therefore Blanchard and Katz’s results suggested that in the long run, economic regions adjust
to asymmetric shocks through changes in the labor market. When one region of a monetary
union suffers an asymmetric shock, it cannot adjust through changes in monetary policy or
currency values. Instead, it can adjust through factor mobility, particularly labor. Workers will
leave the affected area in response to a sudden shock, until unemployment and wages return to
their natural trend. These results imply that even if Mundell’s conditions for an optimal currency
area are not met, in the long run a currency area can function optimally if its component areas
have enough factor mobility to adjust to shocks. Therefore monetary policy could still function
optimally over a geographic area with disparate patterns of production and costs if these
structures are able to respond effectively to shocks.26 With enough mobility of factors of
production, especially labor, regions can adjust to asymmetric shocks. However, it is likely that
an adjustment through factor mobility will take more time than a monetary policy response.
Blanchard and Katz’ results suggest this greater time lag. In the context of the European Union,
policymakers and economists quickly identified factor mobility as an essential part of the EMU’s
future success. The member countries’ structural differences were evident enough to direct much
of the focus onto integration measures to ensure factor mobility.
The second main adjustment mechanism that can absorb asymmetrical shocks is a fiscal
policy controlled by federal authorities. If a currency area also has a unified federal authority
with fiscal powers, then fiscal transfers can alleviate asymmetrical shocks. When one region
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suffers a negative shock, for example, the central government may enact expansionary fiscal
transfers to absorb part of the shock. Although estimates vary, different studies have calculated
that fiscal transfers can absorb between 10% and 40% of an asymmetric shock that negatively
affects one region of a currency area.27 Most of these studies concern fiscal transfers in the US,
because the EU did not create a fiscal union for its members. One study estimated that in
individual European countries, fiscal transfers play an even greater adjustment role than in the
US.28 However, these mechanisms do not exist at the European level and they cannot absorb
asymmetric shocks that affect some countries but not others.
1.4: Conditions for an optimal currency area
An optimal currency area requires synchronized business cycles and similar economic
structures across its members, or robust adjustment mechanisms. Mundell’s theory of optimal
currency areas dealt with the need for similar economic structures, or patterns of production,
across its members. Similarly, the component regions of an optimal currency area need to have
synchronized business cycles. A unified monetary policy will clearly not be optimal if part of a
currency area is experiencing an expansion while another goes through a recession.
Convergences or divergences in patterns of production and business cycles are usually reflected
in indicators such as GDP, inflation, and exchange rates. Therefore an optimal currency area
presumably requires similar levels for these key indicators.
Large currency areas, such as the United States, have disparities in the business cycles
and patterns of production of their regions but rely on flexible adjustment mechanisms to remain
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successful.29 In fact, Eichengreen and Bayoumi’s work found that output variations were larger
in the eight regions of the US than in comparable Eurozone regions. However, regional
variations were somewhat more synchronized with each other in the US than in the EU.30 One
particularly relevant adjustment mechanism is labor market mobility. Blanchard and Katz’s work
shows the important role of labor mobility in adjusting for asymmetric shocks through migration
out of a region. This adjustment mechanism is also weaker in Europe, with a study by the Center
for European Policy Studies finding that the rate of mobility for the US is about ten times higher
than the EU’s. European labor mobility is low both within and across member states.31 Fiscal
transfers are the other important adjustment mechanism in the United States, but do not exist at
the European level.
For a currency area such as the European Union without fully developed adjustment
mechanisms, the structural requirements for an optimal currency area become more important.
Asymmetric shocks pose a large risk to the stability of the currency area, so the main
requirement for optimality is to prevent them. Additionally, the starting conditions of each
member when they join the currency area have to be similar. If members have very different
monetary policy needs when they join the union, then a unified monetary policy runs the risk of
provoking a crisis in certain areas. The empirical literature shows that monetary policy can have
contradictory effects in different regions or sectors, like US policy after the dot com crisis. The
parts of a currency area should have similar economies to make sure they have the same
monetary policy needs, and to minimize asymmetric shocks. There are a few indicators of
convergence or divergence between the economic structures of member parts. They include
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factors such as inflation rates, real exchange rates, real interest rates, and structural factors such
as the business geography of a region.
The second important requirement for an optimal currency area are the adjustment
mechanisms that could help to smooth out asymmetric shocks. There are some important
economic mechanisms that can resolve imbalances by transferring resources from one sector or
region to another, and therefore account for asymmetric effects. In the United States, the most
important adjustment mechanisms are fiscal transfers by the national government and labor
mobility. In the case of the European Union, a fiscal union was rejected by voters and
policymakers in some European countries. The EU adopted a so-called Cohesion Policy, which
makes limited fiscal transfers to promote long term convergence but is not intended as a
mechanism to address shocks. The European Single Market implemented labor mobility and
capital mobility between European countries, although it has limitations.
In the absence of adjustment mechanisms like fiscal transfers and high labor mobility, the
most important determinant of a currency area’s optimality is the similarity in the business cycle
and patterns of production of its members. The members of the European Union have significant
differences in both of these fields. A historical account of how these policies and the
institutional arrangement of the monetary union came about will help identify the causes for its
divergence from an optimal currency area.
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2: The European Monetary Union and its differences from an optimal currency area
The historical evolution and institutional organization of the European Union reveal the
areas where it diverges from an optimal currency area. This section of the essay will examine the
structure of the EU’s economic and monetary union through the historical evidence and relevant
documents. This historical evidence contains economic insights that will be corroborated through
empirical analysis later in the essay. The first part of this section outlines the relationship
between political and economic factors that led to the development of the EU helps frame the
analysis. Then, there is an overview of the political process towards European integration which
was the primary driver for economic integration. A review of the economic policies that were
enacted to achieve integration showcases how economic decisions were subordinated to political
concerns. The documents that came out of this interplay of political and economic factors created
the framework for Economic and Monetary Union: the Delors Report and the Maastricht Treaty.
An analysis of these documents shows the areas where the EMU diverges from an optimal
currency area. Finally, these areas of divergence will be identified as historically mismatched
currency values, different patterns of production, and absent adjustment mechanisms. The
theoretical conclusions of this historical analysis will be tested empirically in the final part of the
essay.
In the complicated language of the European Union, the structure of economic integration
is known as the Economic and Monetary Union or EMU.32 The process leading to EMU started
in the 1950s after the Second World War. As a series of political debates and decisions over the
following decades, the integration process intensified gradually. During the 1980s European
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leaders made the decision to push for a full economic and monetary integration. The Maastricht
Treaty of 1992 created the structure for Economic and Monetary Union. This structure included
the creation of the European Central Bank in 1998 and the adoption of the Euro as a single
currency in 1999.33
2.1: Political origins of European Monetary Union
The European Union was the result of a long political process which European countries
decided to undertake after the Second World War. Economic integration was the trigger, and for
many years the cornerstone, of the European integration process. However, economic integration
never had purely economic motivations. Much of the drive towards the economic union came
from politicians who envisioned an economic union as a guarantee of peace on the European
continent. Therefore, the history of European economic integration is intertwined with the
political debates of 20th century Europe. It can be difficult to analyze economic policies
independently of other political considerations, so it is important to place economic integration in
its historic political context.
The creation of the European monetary union grew out of a political decision to embrace
greater integration and economic policies designed to limit exchange rate instability between
European currencies. These two main currents complemented each other because European
leaders came to see economic integration as a boost to their monetary policies as well as a
political symbol of unity.34 Towards the end of the unification process, policymakers also
emphasized the benefits that a single market would have for economic growth. However, the
roots of the monetary union date from the 1957 Treaty of Rome. The creation of the European
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Economic Community was the first important milestone on the road to European integration,
lowering tariffs and enshrining the ambition for an “ever closer union”.35 This concept of ever
closer union had a clear political motivation to protect peace in the post-World War II years. The
European Economic Community functioned as a guarantee of peace by binding European
economies closer together. There was also a recognition of the economic links between the most
important European economies, France, West Germany, and Italy. Establishing a framework to
manage these linkages could help ease political tensions.
The close economic links between France and Germany provided an additional political
impetus to the integration project during the 1970s. The two nations experienced severe
exchange rate instability, as will be seen in the economic history of European integration.
Policymakers in both nations recognized that their economies were so closely linked together
that the currencies needed to remain at relatively similar exchange rates. The efforts to keep the
French franc and the German Deutschmark relatively stable against each other produced decades
of political tension between France and Germany. A monetary union eventually came to be seen
as the most effective political tool to end exchange rate instability.36 Other core European
economies, like the Netherlands and Italy, also supported integration to stabilize their exchange
rates.37 The Netherlands showed early support for economic integration, partly because it was
already a very open economy. Italy also supported integration while occasionally voicing
concerns about the need for economies to converge before achieving monetary union. Italy had a
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consistently higher unemployment and inflation rates, and feared giving up its monetary policy
to low-inflation economies like Germany.38
Finally, during the 1980s and 1990s the decisive push for monetary union was a result of
political concerns over German monetary dominance and reunification. The German
Bundesbank was so dominant during the 1980s, for reasons that will be explored shortly, that it
effectively set the monetary agenda for Europe. Therefore, French policymakers believed that a
monetary union that established a European Central Bank could help France retain some
influence on monetary policy.39 All countries would have a say in a united monetary policy,
whereas the Bundesbank’s decisions unilaterally impacted the rest of Europe and often posed
political problems. When West Germany reunited with its Eastern counterpart in 1990, European
policymakers feared that the new Germany would stray from its role in the post-war European
order. At the same time, German political leaders wanted to reassure their European counterparts
by showing their commitment to the European political order. This commitment would
legitimize Germany’s push for reunification and gain support from the other European states.
Monetary union therefore became a part of a large political plan for integration that fulfilled
Europe’s political as well as economic objectives. In this political context, the economic policies
that integrated Europe prove to be part of a larger diplomatic plan. It becomes clear why the
structure of the economic and monetary union that emerged from the political process sometimes
diverged from an optimal currency area.
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2.2: Economic Factors of European Monetary Union
European countries decided to form a currency area in order to stabilize their exchange
rates, coordinate their monetary policy, and increase trade by deepening the Single Market. In
the years of the Bretton Woods system, concerns over exchange rate fluctuations first caused
European countries to evaluate the possibility of a monetary union. In particular, the monetary
divergence of France and West Germany raised fears of currency instability and set a pattern that
lasted for the following decades. The instability spread to other European currencies and smaller
countries also came to support integration. The currency fluctuations also made trade and
business transactions more difficult. The Bundesbank, which directed West German monetary
policy, had a very significant effect on monetary policy throughout Europe by the 1980s.
Therefore France, as well as countries like Belgium and Italy, believed that a unified monetary
policy for Europe would achieve better results than attempting to coordinate their policies with
the Bundesbank unilaterally. During the 1980s European policymakers also became convinced
that opening and integrating European economies with one another would boost trade and
growth in Europe. The plan for economic and monetary union developed out of this desire to
achieve a stable and coordinated monetary policy along with deeper integration.
The plan for European monetary integration was a response to the spike in monetary
instability caused by the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in the early 1970s. In response,
European leaders created the European Monetary System, which functioned as a soft peg where
currencies fluctuated within a certain band of each other. These early steps of European
monetary union were designed exclusively with the objectives of political and currency stability.
The collapse of Bretton Woods risked massive fluctuations in European currencies, caused by
factors like the divergence between the Bundesbank’s tight monetary policy and the Banque de
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France’s relatively loose policy. The Bundesbank considered a low inflation rate to be its sole
and indispensable objective. Therefore the value of the Deutschmark remained consistently high
against the French franc, which weakened as a result of loose monetary policy.40 In turn, these
differences might cause economic problems if German firms suddenly lost competitiveness, or
France experienced high inflation. These types of economic problems could be blamed on other
European states and increase political instability. The European Monetary System and the
“Snake” system of exchange rates which it used for a decade, were created to solve these
political and currency issues. They were not created with an optimal currency area in mind of the
type which Robert Mundell envisioned.
The first proposals for monetary union around 1970 met with disagreements over whether
the ERM system should lead to a full economic and monetary union. Some policymakers raised
the types of objections about regional divergences that OCA theory suggested. Countries such as
the Netherlands took a strict view that European economies needed to converge before a full
monetary union was considered.41 Even in later years when Europe was on the road to a
monetary union, countries like France enacted monetary policies designed to defend the stability
of their currency and not to optimize for domestic growth or employment.42 Another difference
in economic ideology developed with important implications for the future of monetary union. In
general, French policymakers believed that if European countries achieved political and
economic integration first, then this integration would bring about the convergence between their
different economies to make the union sustainable. However, the Germans believed that any
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integration had to wait until economies converged to the necessary level.43 These debates show
that European policymakers were aware that differences between European economies could
threaten the stability of a currency area.
Enthusiasm for closer integration built throughout the late 1970s and 1980s mainly as a
response to growing German economic strength. Throughout this time period, the UK kept its
distance from proposals for monetary integration due to fears that its much weaker currency and
high inflation rate would make it vulnerable to speculation in foreign currency markets.44 This
fear reflected an implicit recognition that the British and German economies were so divergent
that they could not effectively run a common monetary policy. During the decades after World
War II, all the major European states resented the preponderance of the dollar and the excessive
impact of US monetary policy on their economies. This desire to gain monetary independence
versus the US and major economies like Japan provided another undercurrent towards European
monetary union.
During the 1980s, political and economic arguments for monetary union gained traction
as the Single Market was established and German strength increased. Economic integration
preserved France’s importance on the continent, while political integration would legitimize
Germany’s return to the political stage. Secondly, the 1980s and 1990s saw a recurrent series of
monetary conflicts between France and Germany over the value of their currencies. There were
increasingly bitter confrontations about the strength of the Deutschmark and the instability of the
franc, and their destabilizing effects on European economies. Full economic and monetary union
was designed to smooth out this turbulence. At the same time, European countries came to
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support the creation of a Single Market which would lower tariffs, and benefit the whole
continent through increased trade. The Single Market was expected to increase trade and capital
mobility between European economies. Greater capital movements might cause more instability,
and a monetary union was seen as a way to stabilize currency values threatened by large capital
flows.45 As a result of these converging forces, the Delors Committee kickstarted the debates
about full economic and monetary union which culminated with the Treaty of Maastricht in
1992. These debates included comprehensive analyses of the economic consequences of EMU.46
The economists and policymakers who participated in them created the institutions and policies
of EMU to function as optimally as possible. However, the history of the political road to the
Treaty of Maastricht underscores that the creation of an optimal currency area was not the
primary motivation for the creation of the European monetary union.
The recent history of the EU after the 2008 financial crisis makes the structural issues
with the union very clear. The 2016 Brexit vote was the first case of a member country deciding
to leave the Union, although the United Kingdom was never a member of the Eurozone and the
monetary union was not a primary factor in its decision to leave. The Southern European debt
crisis, the Northern European reluctance to transfer fiscal resources, and the rise of antiEuropean populist parties in countries like France and Italy all point towards the structural flaws
in European monetary union.47 During a speech in 2011, ECB President Jean-Claude Trichet
identified the divergences in competitiveness between European countries as one of the main
structural risks for the European monetary union. Unit labor costs increased throughout the
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Eurozone, but they increased at a greater pace in countries like Greece and Ireland.48 These
divergences will be further explored later in the essay. However, the crisis exposed their harmful
effects on the functioning of the EMU. Even though the initial crisis was not itself an asymmetric
shock, because all countries suffered a negative shock, its effects were asymmetric.49 Current
account imbalances likely played a role in the crisis by promoting credit bubbles in countries like
Spain and Greece. These current account imbalances were partly a result of divergent real
effective exchange rates in different countries. Additionally, the low labor productivity in
Southern European countries aggravated the crisis there and made it more difficult for them to
recover.50 These difficulties in adjustment are to some extent rooted in the institutional
framework of the EMU.
2.3: Institutional Framework of the European Monetary Union
2.3.1: The Delors Report
The Delors Report of 1988 set the framework for Economic and Monetary Union as a
guarantee of stability and growth, and placed the single currency at the heart of this project. Once
the European Commission confirmed the goal of achieving Economic and Monetary Union for
Europe, it created a committee including the governors of the European Community’s central
banks, other experts and chaired by the chairman of the European Commission, Jacques Delors.
Even though many of these policymakers shared the traditional divisions between French and
German monetary policy, and other recurring disagreements, they produced a detailed guide
towards EMU.
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The Report rooted the motivations for EMU in the instability of exchange rates after the
collapse of Bretton Woods, and the desire of European countries to maintain exchange rate
stability.51 The European Monetary System had already achieved partial monetary integration,
but a closer monetary union would help stabilize exchange rates, and price levels through
monetary discipline. The report identified the divergence of economic policies in European
countries, especially fiscal policy, as a drag on the effectiveness of monetary integration. The
creation of an EMU offered a way to solve these divergences.
The Delors Report stated that the Single Market and the economic movements it caused
could only be managed effectively through a unified monetary policy. Then the report went on to
outline the official definition of the monetary union it envisioned: “a currency area in which
policies are managed jointly with a view to attaining common macroeconomic objectives”.52
This area would have some key characteristics including the “irreversible convertibility of
currencies,” complete liberalization of capital, and the “irrevocable locking of exchange rate
parities.” Although these objectives could be achieved without an official single currency, it
made sense to introduce the single currency that became the Euro. Accordingly, the new
monetary union needed a common monetary policy to manage the currency directed by what
became the ECB.
In parallel to the monetary union, the Delors Report advocated for an economic union
defined as an unrestricted common market with a common set of rules. The monetary and the
economic aspects of the union were seen to be completely intertwined. Crucially, the Report
acknowledged that the loss of monetary independence for the different countries of the union
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might lead to economic imbalances. The Report correctly identified the causes of these
imbalances as the structural impacts of a common market, cost differences, asymmetric shocks,
and divergent national economic policies. After this comprehensive evaluation of the types of
imbalances that might arise, the Report offered a more limited set of possible solutions. The most
important suggestions were measures to improve the mobility of factors of production, and
flexibility of prices. Finally, the Report recognized the crucial importance of maintaining
relatively similar economic policies at the national level. Especially in terms of fiscal policies,
which could become an important source of imbalances.
2.3.2: The Treaty of Maastricht
The Treaty of Maastricht incorporated the Delors Report’s guidelines into a binding
agreement to achieve EMU within a decade. By 1991, European leaders were mostly on board
with the project for a closer union. While the Treaty of Maastricht had important political effects
that updated the Treaty of Rome and established new European institutions, its most important
impact was the creation of EMU. The Maastricht Treaty embraced the guiding principles of the
Delors Report about the necessity for monetary union.53 Most importantly, the leaders who
convened at Maastricht decided to set the single currency as the final goal of monetary union.
Therefore, the Treaty embraced the creation of the Euro and the central bank which the
Delors Report had proposed as options. While the Delors Report had only proposed a system to
unite the existing European central banks into a coordinated system, the Maastricht Treaty laid
out the creation of a totally new European Central Bank.54 This measure was relevant because
the system of European central banks would have had greater political oversight and
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interference. Instead, the European Central Bank was explicitly created to be as independent as
possible from political pressures, following the model of the Bundesbank. The ECB’s
independence meant that its policy would be more credible and achieve greater price stability,
but also much more inflexible in responding to the needs of particular countries.
The parties at Maastricht recognized that there needed to be a certain level of
convergence among the European economies before the adoption of the Euro. As a result they set
out a series of criteria for countries to be admitted into the monetary union and the single
currency.55 Most importantly, there were limits on each country’s budget deficit, inflation rate,
interest rate, and debt levels. The budget deficit was capped at 3% of GDP, and countries would
presumably not enter the monetary union if they did not meet this criterion. Additionally, a
member country’s debt could not exceed 60% of its GDP. Morevoer, the Treaty limited the
Union institutions and the ECB’s capacity to bail out nations that ran into difficulties, in an
attempt to minimize moral hazard problems.56 However, the Maastricht convergence criteria led
to a series of disputes about how much convergence the monetary union would requires.
Crucially, the Treaty did not establish a binding political union, meaning that there was not a
binding union on national economic policies, except for a suggestion that they should be
“coordinated” with the European authorities and other countries.57 Finally, the Maastricht Treaty
was innovative by creating a Cohesion Fund designed to promote poorer European regions and
facilitate their convergence with the richer part of the continent.58
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The Treaty of Maastricht was signed and ratified by all the members of the European
Community, although the United Kingdom and Denmark opted out of the full Economic and
Monetary Union. Accordingly, the Treaty set a timetable for full monetary union which
depended on the convergence criteria. While the exchange rates of European currencies were
irrevocably fixed during “Phase I” of the Maastricht process, subsequent integration would only
happen if the criteria were met.59 The German authorities were convinced that some convergence
needed to happen before the union was locked in, while other countries expected convergence to
happen as a result of union. There were disagreements about how to measure convergence, so the
political leaders at Maastricht chose nominal indicators like the deficit, inflation, and debt. This
decision was important because there were underlying conditions that were not taken into
account and arguably played a more important role in structural convergence. For example,
Germany’s moderate wage growth played an important role in keeping its inflation down and its
currency valuable compared to France or Italy. Germany’s cost structure also helped keep its
exports competitive and contributed to the strength of the Mark.
Therefore, constraining countries’ public spending and monetary policy in the years
before the Euro may not have been enough to ensure convergence. Many countries then broke
the convergence criteria, which pushed the timetable for full EMU from 1997 to 1999.60 Even
though European leaders held the threat of excluding some countries when they made the final
decision in 1998, no country was left out. There were doubts about the accuracy of some
countries’ figures throughout the process, such as Greece. Moreover, countries took
extraordinary measures in order to decrease their spending in the two years before union in 1999.
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When these temporary measures expired, they returned to their previous pattern of spending in
spite of the Stability and Growth Pact that was intended to lock governments into fiscal
discipline.61 Ultimately, many policymakers were aware of the difficulties in meeting the
Maastricht criteria, but the political necessity of completing the process took precedence over the
economic warnings. The Treaty of Maastricht and the subsequent process of unification
underscored the divergence between European countries but also their potential to converge.
2.4: The European Monetary Union’s divergence from an optimal currency area
The institutional design and creation of Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union
incorporated some features of an optimal currency area, but the members had different monetary
policy needs as a result of different patterns of cost and production. At the moment when the
European Union adopted a single monetary policy and unified currency, the economies of its
members had fundamental divergences from each other.62 Countries in the European periphery
experienced different shocks from core economies, had different labor productivities and
structurally higher inflation. These divergences in cost and production meant that a single
monetary policy was not optimal for the member economies. However, the fact that the
Economic and Monetary Union was not an optimally functioning currency area does not
necessarily mean that it was a failure. The European Union was not designed to match all of
Mundell’s criteria for an optimal currency area. Throughout the history of European integration,
there were other motivating factors which were arguably more important.
The most important was the desire to achieve political integration and safeguard peaceful
cooperation between European countries. As discussed previously, exchange rate stability and
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coordinating monetary policy were the other main goals of monetary union. With those
objectives in mind, the European monetary union did give a greater voice to non-German
policymakers although the ECB has remained very independent of political authorities.63 The
introduction of the single currency clearly eliminated exchange rate instability among European
economies. The most important drawback to the monetary union was the loss of policy flexibility
and exchange rate adjustment mechanisms, as Mundell had already pointed out. The lack of
adjustment mechanisms meant that monetary policy would have different and counterproductive
effects on different parts of the European Union, as Mundell pointed out in his example of a
region suffering from a recession versus a region with high inflation.64
Moreover, the lack of exchange rate flexibility meant that the single currency might be
valued too highly for some countries and cause their exports to lose competitiveness.
Alternatively the currency might have been undervalued for some countries and caused
inflationary pressures, but the ECB’s policy effectively opted for a strong currency rather than a
weak one. As early as 2007, the vice-president of the ECB recognized the danger of divergences
in competitiveness between European countries. Vice President Papademos argued that
divergences in unit labor costs drove the differences in inflation rates and competitiveness
between European economies. While the differentials in inflation rates of European countries are
similar to those in the US, they persist for a longer time. Papademos argued that unit labor cost
divergences drove these persistent inflation differentials that undermined the competitiveness of
some countries.65 As some countries experienced higher inflation than others, some economists
argued that their effective exchange rates would also diverge. Divergent effective exchange rates
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in different regions can lead to current account imbalances as some regions get a boost to exports
and others lose export competitiveness. These imbalances widen the gap between what monetary
policies each region would prefer. Divergences in competitiveness increase the likelihood of
countries being affected differently by asymmetric shocks and lead to further divergences in
optimal monetary policies for different countries.
Comparing the EU with Mundell’s optimal currency area reveals two main problems in
its structure as a monetary union. First, the economies of individual member countries have
significant differences in price levels, real exchange rates, and real interest rates. Second, their
economies diverge due to different cost and production patterns. These structural differences
feed into the nominal indicators of divergence such as the price and exchange rate levels. There
is no conclusive proof that the European Union does or does not function as an optimal currency
area, or that it is partly optimal. Some scholars argued that member countries of the EU would
only enter into a currency union if its benefits outweigh its costs. If the beneficial effects of
currency union, such as increased trade, are greater than its drawbacks then the union is optimal
for its members.66 A historical overview of the EU’s creation reveals that the monetary union
was not designed to exactly match Mundell’s criteria for an optimal currency area. However,
European leaders were aware of the economic differences which could threaten the functioning
of the currency area.
The Delors Report which created the framework for European monetary union identified
the problems with structural divergence in European economies and contradictory national
policies. When the Maastricht Treaty established the European Union in 1992, some of these
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concerns were addressed. The convergence criteria were an attempt to synchronize the economic
policies of different countries.67 In order to solve the deeper structural differences of cost and
productivity that gave rise to asymmetric shocks, the Treaty relied on the process of economic
integration. Scholars and policymakers like ECB President Jean-Claude Trichet predicted that
greater integration in financial markets and labor markets would lead to convergence or at least
help with adjustment to shocks.68
The evidence from US regions showed the importance of labor market flexibility and
migration in adjusting to asymmetric shocks. The European treaties opened borders and
established labor movement across the EU at a basic level. However, European labor mobility
has remained significantly lower than in the US. There are likely both juridical and cultural
reasons for this difference. Some legal obstacles remain, such as barriers to professional
qualifications and movement of social benefits.69 There are also major cultural obstacles to
mobility, such as the diversity of languages spoken in Europe. The aging of the population and
the rise of double-income households also make mobility more difficult. The recent Eurozone
crisis destroyed the availability of jobs in some areas and discouraged movement there.70 Other
studies suggested that integrated financial markets could transfer capital in ways that helped
adjust to asymmetric shocks between regions. Mundell himself supported his view in his later
work.71 Finally, the Treaty of Maastricht outlined a Cohesion Policy that called for small scale
fiscal transfers to the poorest regions of the EU. These funds would be used on infrastructure and
other projects aiming to improve productivity.
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In summary, the European monetary and economic union was created to reinforce
political integration and stabilize currency exchange rates. It was not created to be an optimal
currency area, but comparing the EU’s architecture to an optimal currency area reveals a lack of
economic convergence and adjustment mechanisms. European leaders were aware of some of
these structural flaws, and addressed them with three main policies in the Treaty of Maastricht.
First, the convergence criteria attempted to synchronize national economic policies enough to
successfully launch the monetary union. Second, closer economic integration especially of
financial and labor markets, was intended to create more flexible adjustment mechanisms in case
of a shock. Finally, the Cohesion Policy set up some fiscal transfers to facilitate structural
convergence of the poorest regions of the EU. The convergence criteria quickly ran into political
difficulties. Countries may have obfuscated their data to meet the criteria in the short term. After
a few years, even the most important countries abandoned the fiscal criteria and they never
served to achieve long term convergence. Therefore, the responsibility for convergence fell on
the policies of economic market integration and cohesion. It is important to analyze these two
areas of policy, as well as the relevant indicators of monetary convergence, to understand
whether the EU has drawn closer to an optimal currency area.
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3: Measuring convergence towards an optimal currency area
The areas where the European economic and monetary union diverges from an optimal
currency area can be illustrated more clearly through empirical analysis. This essay will therefore
conclude with an empirical analysis of convergence towards an optimal currency area. First, a
discussion of the broad structure explains why it is necessary to focus on the indicators of
convergence that follow from optimal currency area theory. The analysis will examine variables
that explain convergence or divergence from the conditions of an OCA. Then a stylized
overview of the indicators goes over the main factors of convergence and divergence: exchange
rates and monetary policy, patterns of production and business cycles, and adjustment
mechanisms. The main challenge in evaluating these data is the large number of different
variables which can be measured but are related with each other. Therefore the chosen
methodology is to conduct a factor analysis of the possible variables that can indicate
convergence towards an optimal currency area, followed by a case study of one application for
the indicators. The types and sources of data from the Eurostat agency will be outlined. The
essay will conclude with a detailed explanation of the results and their implications.
3.1: How to measure the optimality of a currency area
There is no single way to measure economic divergence or convergence. However, it is
useful to leverage the wide range of European statistics available to approach some indicator of
convergence. The large number of different statistics that the EU collects and the lack of a single
methodology means that there are important assumptions and choices to make. The most
common measure of convergence is GDP per capita. GDP per capita is commonly used to
measure the convergence of subnational regions within the union, because it is fairly useful as a
measure for quality of life. However, GDP per capita is not necessarily the best and certainly not
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the only indicator of convergence. In particular, the optimal performance of the EU as a currency
area does not necessarily depend on having a uniform GDP per capita across countries and
regions. Optimal currency area theory illustrates how an optimally functioning currency union
requires more than similar levels of GDP across its component regions.72 Elements such as the
price level, business cycle, patterns of production, factor markets, and adjustment mechanisms
are equally important, and they have been the main subject of studies evaluating whether the EU
qualifies as an optimal currency area. The United States, which is often the standard of
comparison for the EU’s monetary performance, has significant differences in GDP across its
regions73 but performs relatively well as a currency area thanks to its adjustment mechanisms in
labor and other factor markets.74 The EU does not have equally strong adjustment mechanisms,
so its convergence depends on whether the members have similar business cycles and patterns of
production. Therefore, the following analysis will focus on indicators of structural convergence
towards an optimal currency area. Indicators of convergence will be studied in light of their
implications for an optimal currency area, and not for convergence of living standards.
The history of the EU reveals some important factors that may serve as indicators for its
distance from an optimal currency area. The first is the difference in currency exchange rates due
to divergent monetary policies. One of the most important historical reasons for the creation of
the European economic and monetary union was the struggle to maintain exchange rate stability.
European policymakers wanted to keep their currencies, particularly the French franc and the
Deutschmark, relatively similar in value to facilitate trade.75 However, differences between
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countries with tight and loose monetary policies meant that exchange rates were constantly
diverging. These differences in exchange rates indicate a number of structural differences that
make currency union more difficult. They indicate a mismatch between economic regions with a
strong export industry and those with weaker exports, a mismatch between looser and
inflationary monetary policies and tighter policies, and divergences in price levels across
different regions. A second historically important factor is the divergence in patterns of cost and
production that cause different business cycles across countries. As Eichengreen and Bayoumi
pointed out, European countries experienced asymmetric shocks to their economies. European
countries had different patterns of production76, so they tended to suffer different shocks at
different times. As a result of different shocks, countries and regions experienced asynchronous
business cycles that meant one country was growing while another was suffering a downturn and
they required different monetary policies.77 Finally, European leaders expected to address these
issues by promoting adjustment mechanisms that enabled labor and capital markets to smooth
out shocks. The Single Market policies were expected to make labor and capital markets more
flexible and integrated. Evidence from the United States suggested that capital markets could
help absorb a significant portion of shocks, and that labor mobility was a major contributor to
smoothing out shocks across regions. Therefore, flexibility and liberalization in factor markets
constitutes an important element of the EU’s optimal functioning.
The main challenge in measuring convergence towards an optimal currency area is the
large number of indicators. The broad areas in which the EU diverges from an optimal currency
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area, exchange rate and price level differences, structural economic differences and factor market
imperfections, can all be measured in a number of different ways. Moreover, there are other
indicators that may be useful, such as GDP itself, or growth rates. It is impractical to analyze all
of these indicators at the same time.78 Another major difficulty is that many of these
measurements are related to each other and affect each other whenever there is change in one of
them. An improvement in labor productivity could improve the export competitiveness of an
economy and strengthen its real exchange rate. Finally, there could conceivably be underlying
factors that are difficult to observe and move some or all of these variables at the same time. A
number of historical structural flaws, like asynchronous business structures and lack of
adjustment mechanisms, and nominal values such as price levels and GDP indicate the EU’s
divergence from an optimal currency area. All of these factors aggregate into a rough picture of
the EU’s distance from an optimal currency area. Therefore, the first part of this analysis will use
a method of factor analysis which helps to sort through a number of different indicators. Factor
analysis assumes that there are unobservable factors that impact several indicators at the same
time. After performing factor analysis on the set of indicators of convergence, the results will
show which of the indicators are explained by each factor and how much of the total variance
they explain. Different indicators will be grouped by their corresponding factor, and the list will
be narrowed down to the most relevant indicators of convergence.
3.2: Methodology79
The analysis will consist of two parts. First, there will be an analysis of the indicators of
convergence or divergence towards an optimal currency area using a factor analysis model. The
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factor analysis model will use a set of eight to twelve different variables that could measure
convergence towards an optimal currency area. The results will illustrate which of these
variables are correlated with each other and how much variance they explain in the full dataset.
Three of the variables will be picked as the most important indicators of convergence. The
second and more brief part of the analysis will test one practical application of these indicators
using Poland as a case study. The three main indicators will be compared to the Eurozone
average to determine how much convergence of divergence there is with a potential entrant to
the monetary union like Poland.
3.2.1: Data Sources
The data for this analysis have been collected from the Eurostat database. Eurostat is the
official statistical agency for the European Union and published a wide variety of social and
economic statistics. Eurostat also compiles a number of indices for economic indicators, some of
which will be used in the analysis. The data includes economic figures at the national and
regional level for the 28 member countries of the EU as of 2018. The figures generally date back
to 1995, although some variables include older data.
3.3: Factors of monetary convergence:
A factor analysis of different economic indicators offers useful insight into the factors of
convergence towards an optimal currency area. The factor analytic method will narrow own the
broad list of indicators to the ones that best reflect the important underlying factors of
convergence towards an optimal currency area. The method of factor analysis has some
drawbacks, so three different versions of the analysis will be performed to minimize errors. The
first analysis is a basic form of factor analysis using national data for the 28 countries of the
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European Union, for data from 2015. The analysis covers the entire European Union and not just
the Eurozone. The other countries of the EU are also integrated with the European economy, so
their economic data provides additional useful observations about the relationships between the
whole continent. It is also useful to have as many observations as possible for the factor analysis
to be more accurate. 2015 is the latest year for which there is data from all the main variables.
Then the same analysis is performed with data from 2005, in order to verify whether there are
significant differences over time in the results. The analysis is then repeated using regional data
from 2015, which contains a much larger number of observations.
The simple analysis uses national data to estimate the main factors of convergence
towards an optimal currency area. The variables chosen are based on the conclusions of optimal
currency area theory and EU history. The variables express the possible divergences in prices,
exchange rates, and interest rates which OCA theory identifies as important. The later regional
version also includes a measurement for the business geography of the region. As a group, the
variables indicate whether different regions have similar monetary policy needs. They reflect
some aspects of the short-term business cycle, such as inflation, but GDP is not included. Most
of the variables are chosen to reflect patterns of production and cost. The results of the analysis
will group some of these variables together according to the underlying factors that affect them
at the same time. The most relevant variables will be considered as the main indicators of
convergence towards an OCA. The variables chosen for the first part of the analysis were:
1. Nominal effective exchange rate (measured as an index for each European country
where each country’s value for 2011=100, not deflated)
2. Real effective exchange rate (measured as an index, where the exchange rate value of
the Euro in each European country in 2011 = 100, deflated by the consumer price index
of each country)
3. Ratio of total exports over total imports (calculated at the national level)
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4. Long term bond yield (measured according to the Maastricht convergence criteria,
based on the long term yield of government bonds for each European country)
5. Labor cost (measured as the average of total compensation per worker, indexed for each
European country in 2011 = 100)
6. Labor productivity (measured as the average value added per labor hour in each
European country, indexed to each year’s Eurozone average = 100)
7. Price level (measured according to the consumer price index in each European country,
divided by the real effective exchange rate)
8. Inflation rate (percent change in the consumer price index by country)

The table below shows the results of the factor analysis. Factors 1 through 8 are possible
underlying factors that explain the variance across the eight variables used. Each factor has an
Eigenvalue, under the column labeled “Variance,” which represents the amount of variance that
factor explains in the original dataset. Factors 5 through 8 have negative Eigenvalues, so they are
dropped. Factors 1 through 4 are kept. Then, the factor matrix is rotated, which means each
factor has a better fit on the data. Table One shows the Eigenvalues after rotation, for the four
factors that were kept. Factors 1 through 3 have significantly higher Eigenvalues than Factor 4.
The commonly used Kaiser criterion states that a factor should be considered explanatory and
kept in the analysis if it has an Eigenvalue greater than 1.80 Factors 1 through 3 have Eigenvalues
greater than 1, so they will be the focus of the analysis. The column labeled “Proportion” shows
the proportion of total variance in the dataset that each factor explains. The column labeled
“Cumulative” suggests that Factors 1 through 3 explain essentially all the variance in the dataset.

Table 1: Factor analysis at national level, 2015

80

http://www.surveyanalysis.org/wiki/Determining_the_Number_of_Components_in_Principal_Components_Anal
ysis

44

Factor

Variance

Difference

Proportion

Cumulative

Factor1
Factor2
Factor3
Factor4

2.33692
1.91197
1.62617
0.21434

0.42495
0.28580
1.41183
.

0.4102
0.3356
0.2854
0.0376

0.4102
0.7458
1.0312
1.0688

LR test: independent vs. saturated:

chi2(28) =

133.12 Prob>chi2 = 0.0000

Table 2: Factor loadings for national level, 2015

Variable

Factor1

Factor2

Factor3

Factor4

nom_eer_2015
real_ee~2015
exports~2014
ir_bond~2015
labourc~2015
relativ~2015
pricele~2015
inflati~2015

-0.0873
0.0910
0.4084
-0.3923
-0.4292
0.8872
0.9395
0.3825

0.9033
0.8426
-0.4987
-0.0472
0.2547
-0.1957
0.1207
-0.1316

-0.0111
0.2262
0.3398
-0.7728
0.7333
0.1583
-0.0186
0.5469

-0.0536
0.0693
-0.2681
0.0423
-0.0163
-0.1348
0.1228
0.3154

Uniqueness
0.1734
0.2258
0.3972
0.2448
0.2130
0.1313
0.0873
0.4378

Factor analysis also calculates the factor loadings, which show which variables are
correlated with each factor. Table 2 shows the factor loadings and the interpretation for each
factor. The variables are ordered in the same order as the variable name list in the previous page.
Their abbreviations correspond to the variable names listed above. Factor 1 is highly correlated
with the relative labor productivity and the price level. It is also correlated to a lesser extent with
the inflation rate, the ratio of exports to imports, the labor cost index, and the bond yield. Factor
2 is correlated almost entirely with the real effective exchange rate and the nominal effective
exchange rate. Factor 3 is correlated with the labor cost index, the inflation rate, and the bond
yield. These results must be carefully interpreted, because they encompass a relatively small data
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set. However, some patterns emerge in the three groups of variables. Factor One seems to be a
measure of productivity, which includes the relative productivity itself along with the price level.
Factor Two measures the effective exchange rate. Factor Three measures inflation, labor costs,
and bond yields. This factor is harder to interpret, but there might be correlation between interest
rates as reflected in bond yields, and the inflation rate. Labor costs may also play a part in
moving inflation rates. The results of the factor analysis do not confirm causation, so it is
important to compare different results. The second analysis with 2005 data and regional data will
help to interpret the results.
One of the major potential inaccuracies in this analysis is its inability to account for time
effects. The data for all of these economic indicators exists as time series, showing the values of
each indicator over a period of about twenty years. Many economic factors could experience
endogenous changes, such as an increase in price level due to momentum from the previous
year’s price level. Factor analysis can only show results for one year at a time and therefore
misses these effects. Most importantly, the results from one year could simply be different from
another year. If running a factor analysis on data from 2015 produces a different set of factors
from an analysis of 2005 data, then there is a major problem with the usefulness of results from
any given year.
As discussed previously, this essay will use a very basic way to check the problem. The
same analysis will be repeated for data from 2005, and the results will be compared to the
baseline results from the 2015 data. If the results are relatively similar, then it will be assumed
that there has not been significant change in the time period covered by this paper. This basic
workaround seems reasonable because the theory of optimal currency areas suggests that the
factors that determine the functioning of an OCA should be stable over time. According to OCA
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theory, the determining factors of a currency area’s optimality are structural factors such as
patterns of production, capital and labor markets, and production costs. There is no implication
that over time, a different factor will come to be important for the optimal functioning of a
currency area.
While it would be even more informative to include endogenous effects and a deeper
analysis of the time series implications of this factor analysis, the basic test comparing two
different years suggests that the results are fairly similar over time. The following table shows
the results from a factor analysis using the same variables, but using data from 2005:
Table 3: Factor analysis at national level, 2005

Factor

Variance

Difference

Proportion

Cumulative

Factor1
Factor2
Factor3
Factor4
Factor5

2.00633
1.85023
1.81088
1.39368
0.06341

0.15610
0.03935
0.41720
1.33027
.

0.2881
0.2657
0.2600
0.2001
0.0091

0.2881
0.5537
0.8137
1.0138
1.0229

LR test: independent vs. saturated:

chi2(28) =

Table 4: Factor loadings for national level, 2005

211.42 Prob>chi2 = 0.0000
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Variable

Factor1

Factor2

Factor3

Factor4

Factor5

nom_eer_2005
real_ee~2005
exports~2005
ir_bond~2005
labourc~2005
relativ~2005
pricele~2005
inflati~2005

0.9478
0.8674
-0.0220
0.3191
0.1609
0.2115
0.4252
0.0452

-0.1744
0.3882
0.2431
-0.3029
0.7811
0.2833
0.4183
-0.8080

-0.0525
0.2130
0.8822
-0.2153
0.2180
0.6625
0.5631
-0.3666

-0.1404
0.1285
0.1351
-0.7424
0.3974
0.6002
0.4936
-0.1620

0.0281
-0.0004
-0.0404
0.0617
0.1548
0.1220
0.0455
0.1275

Uniqueness
0.0481
0.0351
0.1422
0.2051
0.1346
0.0609
0.0813
0.1682

Table 3 shows the results for the analysis with 2005 data, after rotation. There is one
important difference from the 2015 analysis: there are now four factors with Eigenvalues greater
than 1. Therefore Factors 1 through 4 are considered relevant, and it is important to interpret
them. Table 4 shows the factor loadings and suggests that the factors are not significantly
different from the 2015 factors, just in a different order of significance. Factor One includes the
nominal effective exchange rate and the real effective exchange rate. This factor is essentially the
same as Factor Two in the 2015 analysis, but in the results from 2005 it has a greater Eigenvalue.
This suggests that the exchange rate factor was more impactful in explaining the variance in
2005 than in 2015. Factor Two includes the labor cost index and the inflation rate. There are also
lesser correlations with the real effective exchange rate, the bond yield, and the price level. This
factor seems to be similar to Factor Three in the 2015 analysis, which included the labor cost and
inflation rates. There are two important differences, because the correlation coefficient for the
inflation rate seems to be negative in 2005, and bond yield has a much lower correlation
coefficient. It is more difficult to explain this factor, and to explain the negative correlation with
inflation. The negative correlation could be showing the effect of an interest rate hike which
decreased the inflation rate, but this is only a hypothetical explanation. This factor does still
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resemble Factor Three from the 2015 analysis, but it becomes significantly less clear. Factor
Three includes the ratio of exports to imports, the relative labor productivity, the price level, and
with a smaller coefficient the inflation rate. This factor is very similar to Factor One from the
2015 analysis, which reflected the labor productivity. The ratio of exports to imports now has a
larger coefficient, but it was already present in the 2015 data.
The composition of Factors 1 through 3 remains fairly similar to their composition in
2015. The factors simply have a different order, because they each explain different proportions
of the total variance as reflected by their different Eigenvalues in 2005. The only significant
difference from the 2015 results is the presence of a fourth seemingly significant factor, which
accounts for roughly 20% of variance in the data. Factor Four has the highest correlation with the
long term bond yield. The next strongest correlations are the relative labor productivity, the price
level, and the labor cost index. Therefore it is very difficult to interpret this factor. It does not
seem like this fourth factor represents any important missing factor from the 2015 data. It cannot
be dismissed, because it has a significant Eigenvalue, but it could also be a random outlier. The
results from 2005 are similar enough to the 2015 results that major changes over the time period
of this essay would not seem to be a major concern. The important patterns in the data remain the
same.
The last important adjustment to the analysis is the inclusion of a larger data set. The
national data only comprises 27 observations, or fewer in cases where there is data missing for
some countries. This limited data set calls into question the accuracy of the results. Therefore, it
is possible to use regional data to get more observations and a more accurate estimate. This
second version of the analysis uses observations from 239 regions within the EU. With this
larger data set, it is possible to approach the threshold of 300 observations that the UCLA IDRE
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considers sufficient. Because it is more accurate to estimate correlations between two variables
with a large number of observations, the results of the factor analysis will be more robust. The
regional data also includes some new indicators that can be added as extra variables. There are
four additional variables in this regional analysis that were not included in the previous two. The
factors can be estimated more robustly with the new variables, because they help to isolate the
effects of other variables. Three of the four added variables are indicators of business geography,
or patterns of production, within regions. These variables show the percentage of the region’s
labor force employed in knowledge-intensive services, high-tech manufacturing, and general
manufacturing.
Optimal currency area theory suggests that patterns of production within different regions
are very important to the functioning of a currency area. A region that relies on low skill
manufacturing will likely need a different monetary policy than a region specializing in highwage knowledge-intensive services. It would be expected that a region that specializes in
knowledge intensive services, such as financial services, would have high wage and price levels.
However, such a region might be less affected by interest rate changes than a region specializing
in manufacturing, because it has smaller investment needs. These types of differences between
regions represent the types of divergences that optimal currency area theory considers
suboptimal for the functioning of a currency area. Regions with different patterns of production
are more likely to suffer asymmetric shocks of the type described by Mundell and then explored
by Eichengreen and Bayoumi.
The fourth new variable, gross fixed capital formation, measures investment in
productive assets within each region. This GFCF variable is another indicator of patterns of
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economic activity in different regions, because regions with a larger investment rate are likely to
have a different pattern of production from those with lower rates.
The eight original variables were assumed to be standard across every region of their
respective country. For each region, the four new variables have unique values. The regional
values of the eight original variables were assumed to be the same as the national value (for
example, the inflation rate for every region of Belgium is the same as the national inflation rate
for Belgium). The new set of variables is:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Percentage of the regional population employed in high-tech manufacturing
Percentage of the regional population employed in knowledge intensive services (KIP)
Percentage of the regional population employed in any manufacturing
Gross fixed capital formation (the total investment by producers in fixed assets by
region by year, measure of investment)
5. Nominal effective exchange rate (measured as an index for each European country
where the value for 2011=100, not deflated)
6. Real effective exchange rate (measured as an index, where the exchange rate value of
the Euro in each European country in 2011 = 100, deflated by the consumer price index
of each country)
7. Ratio of total exports over total imports (calculated at the national level and
standardized across regions)
8. Long term bond yield (measured according to the Maastricht convergence criteria,
based on the long term yield of government bonds for each European country)
9. Labor cost (measured as the average of total compensation per worker, measured as
index for each European country in 2011 = 100)
10. Labor productivity (measured as the average value added per labor hour in each
European country, index where 2011 value = 100)
11. Price level (calculated as a ratio of purchasing power parities to exchange rates – only
available at the national level and standardized across regions)
12. Inflation rate (percent change in the consumer price index by country)

The results of the new analysis with additional variables are as follows:
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Table 5: Factor analysis at regional level, 2015

Factor

Variance

Difference

Proportion

Cumulative

Factor1
Factor2
Factor3
Factor4
Factor5
Factor6
Factor7

2.94494
2.57762
1.25239
1.24480
0.90312
0.13531
0.04918

0.36732
1.32523
0.00760
0.34167
0.76781
0.08613
.

0.3376
0.2955
0.1436
0.1427
0.1035
0.0155
0.0056

0.3376
0.6332
0.7768
0.9195
1.0230
1.0385
1.0442

LR test: independent vs. saturated:

chi2(66) = 2492.00 Prob>chi2 = 0.0000

Table 6: Factor loadings for regional level, 2015

Variable

Factor1

Factor2

Factor3

Factor4

Factor5

Factor6

Factor7

per_hit~2015
per_kis_2015
per_man~2015
gfcf_2015
nom_eer_2015
real_ee~2015
exports~2014
ir_bond~2015
labourc~2015
relativ~2015
pricele~2015
inflati~2015

0.1581
0.4778
-0.0809
0.2353
-0.0549
0.0699
0.3634
-0.8061
-0.1023
0.8709
0.7073
0.7554

0.0997
0.3019
-0.3128
-0.0564
0.9656
0.9495
-0.5228
0.0576
0.0784
-0.0903
0.4962
-0.0672

0.1088
-0.1371
0.2757
-0.1034
-0.0272
0.0959
0.1041
-0.4155
0.8358
-0.3051
-0.3844
0.0464

0.2232
0.6702
-0.7049
0.0618
0.1400
0.1026
-0.2809
0.0300
-0.1979
0.1691
0.2450
0.0860

0.7144
0.3491
-0.0492
0.4733
0.0261
0.0477
0.0869
-0.1306
0.0387
0.0811
0.0735
0.0583

0.0269
0.0444
0.0300
-0.1140
-0.0862
0.0888
-0.0465
0.0032
0.0085
-0.1227
-0.0210
0.2927

0.0180
-0.0365
-0.0200
-0.0438
0.0063
-0.0031
0.2012
0.0338
0.0086
0.0560
0.0002
-0.0184

Uniqueness

The results show that Factors 1 through 4 have Eigenvalues greater than 1.0, and Factor 5
has a very close value of 0.9. These factors together account for essentially all of the variance
within the data set. The cumulative value shown is actually slightly over 100%, due to
calculation inaccuracies. It is possible the new factor may represent some of the new variables,
which would mean that the variables included in the new factor were not correlated with any of

0.3919
0.0875
0.3189
0.6880
0.0362
0.0637
0.4547
0.1551
0.2440
0.0869
0.0398
0.3259
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the variables in the previous three factors. However, the initial list of factors is not fully
informative and the factor loadings will give a better picture of the results.
The factor loadings are generally similar to the first two analyses, but there are some
differences in variable correlations. The first two factors remain largely similar to the factors
from the original analysis, and remain the most important factors of the set. Factor One is
correlated with the price level and relative labor productivity by country. In this version of the
analysis it is also strongly correlated with the inflation rate, which in previous analyses was more
correlated with labor costs. Factor One is also correlated with the bond yield, which has been
associated with different factors in every analysis. It is also somewhat correlated with the new
variable for employment in knowledge intensive services. This correlation has interesting
implications, because it could mean that regions specializing in knowledge intensive services
have higher relative productivity and price levels. Factor Two, as in the original analysis, is
almost completely correlated with the real and nominal effective exchange rates. There are also
smaller correlations with the ratio of exports to imports and the price level variable. This result
confirms the relevance of the exchange rate factor in the original analysis. Factor Three is mostly
correlated with the labor cost index. It is also correlated with employment in manufacturing, the
price level, and bond yield, although much more weakly. These three factors are very similar to
the results of the original analysis, although the most important change is that inflation is
associated with labor productivity instead of labor cost. The employment variables add some
potential implications to the results because of the correlation between employment in
knowledge intensive services and productivity.
Factor Four is different from the previous analyses and reflects the new variables
included. This factor is mostly correlated with the variable for employment in knowledge
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intensive services, and negatively with the variable for employment in manufacturing. There are
also much smaller correlations with the ratio of exports to imports, and with the price level
variable. This result seems to support the hypothesis that production patterns in regions are
important factors in structural divergences from an optimal currency area. The level of
employment in knowledge intensive services determines a significant portion of the variability
across all the indicators studied. Factor Five has a smaller Eigenvalue, but it is very close to the
threshold for significance. Factor Five is most closely correlated with the variable for
employment in high tech manufacturing. It is also correlated with employment in knowledge
intensive services, and with the variable for gross fixed capital formation. This factor is similar
to Factor Four, but it clearly reflects the presence of high-tech capital-intensive manufacturing in
a region. This result suggests that regions specializing in industries that are capital and
investment intensive experience significant divergences from other regions. The regional
analysis confirms the basic robustness of the first three factors: price level and labor
productivity, effective exchange rates, and labor costs. However, the new variables underscore
the significance of different regional patterns of production. Differences in employment in key
industries such as knowledge intensive services explain a significant part of the variability across
many indicators of monetary divergence.
All the iterations of the factor analysis confirm some basic results with two or three
particularly important factors. It is important to remember that the results of factor analysis do
not imply any causal relationship between the components of a factor, or between a factor and its
component. The results do provide valuable insight into the correlations between different
variables of the data. However, the results as shown above are different enough that it is not
possible to confirm a single set of factors as the ideal indicator for convergence towards an
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optimal monetary area. Although factor analysis is sometimes used to generate an index based on
its results, this essay will not create an index of convergence due to the varied results in some of
the factors. Instead this section will review the factor results across all three analyses and identify
the most stable or informative to use as individual indicators. The most stable factor across all
three analyses is the effective exchange rate factor. This factor had high correlations with the real
effective exchange rate and the nominal effective exchange rate. It did not have high correlation
with any other variable. Given the long history of exchange rates in the European debates about
monetary union and their effects on a country’s competitiveness, the real effective exchange rate
is one useful indicator of convergence. The factor which represents the relative labor
productivity, price level, and in some versions inflation and bond yields, also remains relatively
stable. There are differences across the three analyses in the composition of this factor and the
amount of variance it explains, but it is always significant. The best measure for this factor may
be relative labor productivity, because that indicator is indexed to the Eurozone average. It is
therefore a useful way to compare productivity across members of the currency area.
The results for the labor cost index and the inflation rate are more difficult to interpret.
The labor cost index and inflation rate are both correlated to the same factor in the national
analyses for 2005 and 2015. However, in the regional analysis inflation has almost no correlation
with the labor cost, and instead seems to be more highly correlated with labor productivity
(Table 6). In the national 2005 data, inflation also has a negative correlation with the
corresponding factor while labor costs have a positive correlation. As discussed in the analysis
results, this discrepancy could potentially be explained by a lag in the business cycle that
affected one indicator but not the other. In any case, it does not seem possible to account for both
inflation and labor costs in a single factor. Neither one of these indicators can be assigned to a
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different factor based on the results. However, inflation is an important indicator that was used in
the Maastricht convergence criteria. It reflects both the business cycle of an economy and
structural conditions like the labor cost (even if there is an erratic correlation in these analyses).
Therefore inflation rate will be considered an indicator of convergence even if it does not fit
easily with the factor analysis.
Finally, the indicators for economic geography are very relevant in the regional analysis.
The variable for employment in knowledge intensive services has some level of correlation with
many factors, and it is highly correlated with one unique factor. That factor is also negatively
correlated with employment in manufacturing, although not with employment in high tech
manufacturing. Therefore this factor seems to represent the pattern of production in a given
region. Regions that specialize in knowledge intensive services will be very different from those
that specialize in basic manufacturing. This factor will be represented by the percent of the total
population employed in knowledge intensive services.
The factor analysis narrowed down the list of indicators of convergence. All of these
indicators are important because as the factor analysis showed, they are correlated with other
relevant economic variables. These indicators are consistent with the conclusions of optimal
currency area theory. They are different from the Maastricht convergence criteria, which will be
discussed at the end of this section. The factor analysis does not suggest any causal relationship
between these indicators and convergence, or between the indicators themselves. However, the
analysis suggests that the following indicators show valuable insights about whether different
economies are similar enough to be in an optimal currency area:
1. Real effective exchange rate
2. Relative labor productivity
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3. Inflation rate
4. Employment in knowledge intensive services
3.4: Poland as a case study for convergence indicators
While the factor analysis served to narrow down some of the most important indicators of
convergence towards an optimal monetary area, they could have many different uses. In this
section, one specific example will be considered by analyzing the divergences between Poland
and the Eurozone average. Poland is an interesting case study because it is near one of the core
areas of the Eurozone, Germany, but it is not in the Eurozone itself. It is an example of a country
which is presumably integrated with the European economy and may join the monetary union in
the future, but there are enough divergences to keep it out at the moment. The case study of
Poland will illustrate one possible use for the three main indicators identified in the factor
analysis. The price level, exchange rate, and labor cost indicators could be used to give a simple
overview of the most important factors of divergence between a national economy like Poland’s
and the Eurozone average. This simple analysis will use the same Eurostat dataset used for the
factor analysis.
The following tables show the price level and productivity, real effective exchange rate,
and labor cost index for Poland compared to the Eurozone average:
Table 7: Inflation Rate
HICP Rate 1996
Eurozone Average
Poland

1997

2007

2009

2008

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

1.6

1.1

1.1

2.1

2.3

2.2

2.1

2.1

2.2

2.2

15.0

11.8

7.2

10.1

5.3

1.9

0.7

3.6

2.2

1.3

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2.1

3.3

0.3

1.6

2.7

2.5

1.4

0.4

0.0

0.2

1.5

2.6

4.2

4.0

2.6

3.9

3.7

0.8

0.1

-0.7

-0.2

1.6
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Table 8: Nominal Relative Labor Productivity
Nominal Relative
1996 Labour
1997Productivity
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
Eurozone Average
123.4
122.8
123.0
122.2
120.9
118.4
117.6
116.3
115.2
115.4
115.3
Poland
44.7
45.4
47.3
48.3
49.7
49.4
48.7

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

114.9

114.2

114.0

112.7

112.5

112.2

112.6

112.3

111.6

111.7 :

49.6

50.3

52.7

56.6

58.9

59.6

59.3

58.9

58.9

59.1 :

Table 9: Real Effective Exchange Rate
Real Effective
1996Exchange
1997
Rate 1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
Eurozone
108.06
98.15
100.01
98.04
87.92
89.23
92.27
102.77
105.68
102.72
101.82
Poland
76.70
78.41
85.58
84.27
92.46
103.44
98.84
88.11
87.11
96.84
98.24

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

103.92

106.97

109.37

100.00

99.64

94.73

98.06

98.65

91.18

93.49

94.58

101.32

110.26

94.24

100.00

97.65

95.53

95.73

96.69

94.29

90.96

93.06

Table 10: Percent of population employed in knowledge intensive services
%KIS
1996
Eurozone :
Poland :

2007

2008

1997

1998

1999

:

:

:

:

:

:

2009

2010

2000

2001
29.7

:

2011

2002
30.3

:

2012

2003
30.6

:

2013

2004
31.3

:

2014

2015

2005

2006

32.1

32.4

32.7

24.3

24.5

24.7

2016

32.9

37.3

38.3

38.9

39.2

39.5

39.5

39.9

40.0

40.1

24.8

28.3

29.5

30.1

30.0

30.6

31.2

31.4

31.2

30.9

The four indicators show important divergences between Poland and the Eurozone. Each
of the tables must be interpreted independently, because each indicator is measured in different
ways. Table 1 shows the evolution of Poland’s inflation rate compared with that of the Eurozone.
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The difference between the Polish and EZ inflation rates is initially very large, but it decreased
sharply around 2001. After 2002 the Polish inflation rate remains similar to that of the EZ but
consistently higher until 2013. After 2013, Poland has had a slightly lower inflation rate than the
Eurozone average. The factor analysis suggested that the inflation indicator is correlated with
labor costs. It is not possible to affirm that labor costs in Poland follow the same pattern as
inflation, but the inflation data suggests that labor costs should not have very large divergences.
Table 2 shows Poland’s labor productivity per hour worked, as a percentage of the EU28
average. This indicator shows a significant and consistent difference between Poland and the
Eurozone average. From 1996 until 2017, Poland’s labor productivity is about 50% lower than
the Eurozone average. There has been a slow convergence, although it seems to have stalled
since 2012. The productivity indicator is also correlated with indicators for price level and
export-import ratio, according to the factor analysis. Therefore, the productivity indicator shows
a significant divergence between the less productive Polish economy and the more productive
Eurozone.
Table 3 shows the changes in Poland’s real effective exchange rate compared to the
Eurozone average. It is not possible to directly compare these exchange rates to each other,
because they are both indexed according to their respective values in 2010. However, the
indicator reveals valuable information about the movement of effective exchange rates. The data
shows considerable fluctuations in Poland’s real effective exchange rate before 2010. These
fluctuations were also not symmetric with the Eurozone’s exchange rate fluctuations, because
Poland’s exchange rate appreciated until 2001 while Europe’s depreciated, and then depreciated
while Europe’s exchange rate appreciated. This data suggests that Poland’s economy was not
synchronized with the Eurozone’s economy in important areas. However, after 2010 the
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fluctuations became smaller. Although Poland’s exchange rate still didn’t move in the same
direction as the Eurozone’s, the movements were smaller. This change may suggest that some
convergence is taking place between effective exchange rates.
Finally, Table 4 shows the percentage of the population employed in knowledge intensive
services for Poland and the Eurozone. The data started to be collected later than the other
indicators, so it is only possible to compare values after 2004. Since 2004 there has been a
consistent difference, with the Eurozone employing 10% more of its population in knowledge
intensive services than Poland. The difference does not seem excessive, but it is significant. This
result suggests that Poland and the Eurozone have differences in their pattern of production as
illustrated by employment in knowledge intensive services.
While the data from these four indicators must be interpreted carefully, it offers insights
into some of Poland’s divergences from the Eurozone. Poland’s inflation rate has clearly drawn
closer to that of the Eurozone in the past five years. This change may point towards some
convergence. The variables correlated with inflation rate, such as labor costs, may also be
relatively convergent. Poland’s labor productivity remains significantly lower than that of the
Eurozone. This indicator is especially significant because it is also correlated with price level and
export fluctuations, and may suggest that these variables are also divergent. Poland’s effective
exchange rate has shown asynchronous fluctuations, but the magnitude of those fluctuations is
decreasing. This shift may suggest a gradual convergence with the Eurozone. Poland’s economic
geography is fairly different from the Eurozone, with less of its total population employed in
knowledge intensive services. Whether these indicators meet the threshold for Poland to be in an
optimal currency area with the Eurozone is outside the scope of this paper. Poland meets many
of the Maastricht criteria, but it has not initiated the final process to join the Eurozone. However,
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the indicators reveal significant divergences remaining between Poland’s labor productivity
relative to the Eurozone at large.
3.5: Indicators of convergence and the Maastricht criteria
The results of the factor analysis illustrate some of the most important possible indicators
of convergence towards an optimal currency area. The data suggests that indicators of
productivity and price level, effective exchange rates, and inflation and labor costs are the most
relevant indicators of convergence. Indicators of economic geography such as percent
employment in knowledge intensive services and manufacturing also offer important insights
about converge.
These results fit comfortably with the theory of optimal currency areas, but give a more
precise notion of the conditions for an OCA. The overview of OCA theory suggested that when a
currency area lacks strong adjustment mechanisms for a shock, its members should have similar
business cycles and patterns of production. The set of indicators obtained from the factor
analysis captures both of these conditions. Inflation generally reflects the business cycle, and the
different employment variables also capture fluctuations in the business cycle. To the extent that
the indicators capture the business cycle, they also reflect the empirical work on the significance
of asymmetric shocks. If the indicators for inflation and employment show a relatively
synchronized business cycle between parts of a currency area, they indicate a lack of asymmetric
shocks. The employment variables reflect regional patterns of production in key sectors such as
knowledge intensive services and manufacturing. The indicator for labor productivity is closely
related with regional patterns of production, because productivity plays a large role in forming
specialization patterns in regions.
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The results of the factor analysis differ from the Maastricht criteria. These criteria are still
used to measure a country’s suitability to join the Eurozone. They include the HICP inflation
rate, budget deficit, debt ratio, bond yield, and a requirement of exchange rate stability for two
years.81 The budget deficit and debt ratio are included to avoid irresponsible fiscal policies by
potential members, but they are not relevant in the context of optimal currency area theory.
Therefore they were not included in the factor analysis. The requirement for exchange rate
stability states that potential candidates must successfully keep their currency pegged to the Euro
for two years. However, it does not measure whether the real exchange rate of the potential
candidate is actually convergent with the rest of the Eurozone. The factor analysis suggests that
the real effective exchange rate is a very important factor of convergence, but it is not included in
the Maastricht criteria. The bond yield was included in the factor analysis, but the results were
inconclusive about its importance as a factor. It may be a relevant indicator, but the results
suggest that it is not as important as other factors like the effective exchange rate. The inflation
rate was also included in the factor analysis, and it seems to be significant. Although the results
of the factor analysis are difficult to interpret because the correlation coefficients for inflation
were different across different versions of the analyses, it was still significant in all of them.
However, the results of the factor analyses suggest that the Maastricht criteria are not the best
indicators of convergence towards an optimal currency area. The Maastricht criteria fail to
capture some important factors of convergence, which may be one reason behind the imbalances
of the Eurozone in recent years.
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At the same time, the results of the factor analysis are not conclusive evidence that the
indicators used in this essay are the best or only indicators of convergence towards an optimal
currency area. They seem to be useful illustrations of some important factors to consider and
raise interesting implications. One interesting result is the importance of patterns of production
when considering convergence between regions. The regional factor analysis shows the
correlation between employment in knowledge intensive services and important indicators of
convergence like effective exchange rates and price levels/inflation. The results of the regional
factor analysis suggest that in order to evaluate whether members of a currency area have
optimal conditions, it is necessary to examine their patterns of production alongside nominal
indicators. In the absence of adjustment mechanisms like fiscal unity, an optimal currency area
may require regions with similar patterns of production that have similar monetary policy needs.
Even when some nominal indicators show convergence, a sudden shock can reveal underlying
divergences and imbalances.
The case study of Poland shows how the indicators measure convergence towards an
optimal currency area. The indicators suggest that Poland is partially but not fully convergent
with the Eurozone. Poland’s inflation rate has been moving at relatively similar levels to the
Eurozone average for the past five years. However, Poland’s labor productivity is still
significantly lower than the Eurozone average and may pose obstacles to an optimal monetary
policy. Its real effective exchange rate is not moving very differently from the Eurozone, but it is
not moving in sync with the Eurozone. These indicators are not to be taken as conclusive proof
of convergence or divergence, but they reveal potential issues with including Poland in the
Eurozone.
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Conclusion
The European Union’s history and policies make for a fascinating area of economic study
because it is not an optimal currency area. Applying the optimal currency area framework to the
EU forces one to evaluate what defines an integrated economic structure. There are valuable
insights to be found in the broad analytical conclusions of OCA theory, the history and
documents of the EU’s creation, and the attempt to measure the divergences from OCA
empirically. The history of the EU from its origins in the post-war period to the recent crisis
makes it clear that OCA theory did influence its structure, but it was not the primary concern
when creating the economic and monetary union.
For that reason, there are a number of gaps between optimal currency area theory and the
current reality of the EU. Identifying and addressing these gaps is essential to the performance of
the union. Since the EU lacks the flexible adjustment mechanisms that made the US into a
successful currency area, it is more vulnerable to asymmetric shocks and imbalances arising
from the divergence between its members. In the absence of robust adjustment mechanisms such
as a fiscal union, the most important requirement for the EU to function optimally is a high
degree of similarity between its member parts. The members of an optimal currency area should
have synchronized business cycles and similar patterns of cost and production.
These requirements are difficult to measure due to the number of different indicators that
could be used, but the factor analysis shows that they can be narrowed down to three or four key
variables. The results of the factor analysis suggest that effective exchange rates, labor
productivity, inflation rate, and employment in knowledge intensive services can explain a large
portion of the total variance across all the indicator variables. While there are still many open
questions about the best way to interpret these results and their causal value, the case study of
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Poland illustrates their usefulness for a brief overview of convergence towards an optimal
currency area.
The European Union has surprised many by enduring severe crises in recent years. Its
resilience shows the underlying strength of its political and economic institutions. To some
extent, these institutions were influenced by decades of work on the conditions for an optimal
currency area. However, the lack of adjustment mechanisms and the divergences in business
cycle and production patterns have posed major challenges for the EU. A factor analysis of
different indicators of convergence towards an optimal currency area suggests that the Maastricht
criteria are not the best indicators for a country’s suitability to enter the Eurozone. The
Maastricht criteria miss important information about real effective exchange rates, labor
productivity, and patterns of production. Achieving a greater degree of convergence in these
indicators may be the only way for the Eurozone to become a more optimal currency area. For
the time being, the jury is still out on the ambitious and fascinating economic project of the
European Union.
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Appendix A: Expanded methodology
Factor analysis is a multivariable model that is useful to explore the relationships
between a large number of different outcome variables and reduce their number. The general
principle behind factor analysis is that a given number of observable variables reflect an equal or
smaller number of unobservable factors that move several of the observable variables.82 Factor
analysis is used commonly with datasets containing many different variables in order to reduce
their number, and sometimes to create a new index out of a combination of variables. This paper
will not attempt to define an index through factor analysis, because the method has limitations
that mean the results must be interpreted carefully. While there are some clear relationships
between the variables that indicate an optimal currency area, the results are not robust enough to
support an index that conclusively indicates convergence of divergence from an optimal currency
area. However, factor analysis is very useful for grouping some variables together if they are
affected by common latent factors. Factor analysis has been used for this purpose in economic
for some time. For the past few decades there has been work using factor analysis to find
relationships between indicators of the business cycle.83 This work illustrates the utility of factor
analysis to estimate economic concepts that are difficult to define. As Diebold and Rudebusch
point out, the business cycle can be expressed through many different indicators, and does not
have a single clear definition. Factor analysis has been used to identify latent factors that move
many of the observable variables simultaneously.
The technique of factor analysis relies on summarizing the correlation structure of the
variables used.84 Correlated variables in the data set are assumed to have a linear relationship
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with underlying latent common factors. Each factor explains a portion of the total variance in the
data set, and the sum of the factors explains all of the variance in the original data set. However,
some factors normally explain a significantly larger portion of the variance, so the analysis
focuses on the most explanatory factors. By keeping a smaller number of factors than the original
number of variables, factor analysis can be used to reduce the number of observable variables
into fewer variables or indices that capture the movement in several of the observable
variables.85 Additionally, factor analysis outputs a matrix of factor loadings, showing how much
correlation there is between each variable and each factor. Therefore, it is possible to identify
with which variables each factor is most closely related.
The main drawbacks to factor analysis in the context of monetary union are that it is only
possible to analyze a cross section of the data, and the small number of observations. Factor
analysis is designed to take a cross section of data and describe a static relationship at a given
moment in time. However, the data describing the monetary characteristics of the European
economic and monetary union is naturally a time series which shows their change over time.
Using a cross section of data from any given year might be problematic because a factor analysis
of data from 2005 will generate factors based on the relationships between variables as they were
in 2005. There is an extensive literature in econometrics that developed a dynamic factor
analysis model, as described by Stock and Watson.86 Dynamic factor analysis has also been used
by Bernanke et al., and Diebold and Rudebusch.87 This analysis replaces the cross section
variables in classic factor analysis with time series variables. However, this paper’s analysis is
cross sectional by nature, because it is accounting for differences between European countries.
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Therefore, a dynamic factor analysis model is not the best fit for this analysis. Instead, the results
will contain a classic factor analysis for two different years. We will verify whether the results
are significantly different for two years, one near the beginning of the available data and one in
the present. We will confirm whether the results are significantly different for two observed
years about twenty years apart. Based on optimal currency area theory, the general conditions
that need to hold for an OCA such as synchronized business cycles and symmetric shocks would
seem to be fairly stable over time. Therefore checking the results for two different years only
serves as a basic check of this principle that the fundamental requirements for an OCA are not
time sensitive. Nevertheless, a faction of European policymakers believed that conditions for an
OCA could develop over time based on the endogenous process of integration. A deeper analysis
of the time implications for OCA is needed but is outside the scope of this essay. The other
major obstacle when employing factor analysis is the small number of observations per variable.
The UCLA Institute for Digital Research and Education cites studies that propose a “good”
number of observations per variable to be around 300.88 Given smaller numbers, the correlation
between different variables becomes less reliable. The data used in this essay comes at two
different levels: national and regional. The national data is available for the 28 countries of the
European Union. This analysis will use data for those 28 countries, and not the 19 countries of
the Eurozone. The EU members which are not in the Eurozone are still closely integrated with
the EZ members. In the case of Eastern European countries, the EU expects to eventually include
those economies in the currency area. These countries will be included in the analysis even if
they are not part of the currency area because the factor analysis only measures the correlation
structure of indicator variables. It is not intended to measure whether the 19 Eurozone countries,
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or the 28 European Union members are actually an optimal currency area or not. Although there
may be some elements of being in a single currency area that affect the movement of the
variables for the cases of the Euro 19, it is assumed that the effect will not be large because for
variables such as interest rates, countries outside the Eurozone have experienced similar
economic conditions to those inside it. The second type of data used in this essay is regional
data, which is available for the NUTSII classification of subnational regions within European
countries. There are 1,311 NUTSII regions identified, a much more optimal number to conduct a
factor analysis with. However, many variables are only available at the national level. Some
variables, like real exchange rates and interest rates, are unified within national economies. For
other variables, regional data is not collected. Therefore, while it would be optimal to have data
at the regional level for all variables included in the analysis, the data is not available. One
iteration of the analysis will be conducted using only national data, and then another will be
conducted with national and regional data.
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Appendix B: Data sets, Stata code, and full tables

Eurostat data sets with ID codes:
Employment in technology and knowledge-intensive sectors by NUTS 2 regions and sex (from
2008 onwards, NACE Rev. 2) (htec_emp_reg2)
Employment in technology and knowledge-intensive sectors by NUTS 2 regions and sex (19942008, NACE Rev. 1.1) (htec_emp_reg)
Export to import ratio (egi_tr1)
Gross fixed capital formation by NUTS 2 regions (nama_10r_2gfcf)
Labour cost index by NACE Rev. 2 activity - nominal value, annual data (lc_lci_r2_a)
Industrial countries' effective exchange rates - annual data (ert_eff_ic_a)
EMU convergence criterion series - annual data (irt_lt_mcby_a)
Labour productivity and unit labour costs (nama_10_lp_ulc)
HICP (2015 = 100) - annual data (average index and rate of change) (prc_hicp_aind)
Purchasing power parities (PPPs), price level indices and real expenditures for ESA 2010
aggregates (prc_ppp_ind)

Stata .do file:
import excel "National Analysis Final.xlsx", firstrow
factor nom_eer_2015 real_eer_2015 exports_imports_2014 ir_bondyield_2015
labourcost_index_2015 relative_labourprod_2015 pricelevel_2015 inflation_2015
rotate
factor nom_eer_2005 real_eer_2005 exports_imports_2005 ir_bondyield_2005
labourcost_index_2005 relative_labourprod_2005 pricelevel_2005 inflation_2005
rotate
clear
import excel "Regional Analysis Final.xlsx", firstrow
factor per_hitech_2015 per_kis_2015 per_manu_2015 gfcf_2015 nom_eer_2015 real_eer_2015
exports_imports_2014 ir_bondyield_2015 labourcost_index_2015 relative_labourprod_2015
pricelevel_2015 inflation_2015

70

rotate

Stata output:
Factor analysis/correlation
Method: principal factors
Rotation: (unrotated)

Number of obs
=
Retained factors =
Number of params =

27
4
26

Factor

Eigenvalue

Difference

Proportion

Cumulative

Factor1
Factor2
Factor3
Factor4
Factor5
Factor6
Factor7
Factor8

2.70819
1.94070
1.23807
0.20244
-0.05649
-0.07946
-0.10756
-0.14851

0.76749
0.70263
1.03563
0.25893
0.02297
0.02810
0.04095
.

0.4753
0.3406
0.2173
0.0355
-0.0099
-0.0139
-0.0189
-0.0261

0.4753
0.8160
1.0333
1.0688
1.0589
1.0449
1.0261
1.0000

LR test: independent vs. saturated:

chi2(28) =

133.12 Prob>chi2 = 0.0000

Factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances

Variable

Factor1

Factor2

Factor3

Factor4

nom_eer_2015
real_ee~2015
exports~2014
ir_bond~2015
labourc~2015
relativ~2015
pricele~2015
inflati~2015

-0.4279
-0.1736
0.6617
-0.5781
-0.2213
0.8927
0.7520
0.5581

0.7082
0.8281
-0.1724
-0.5281
0.5552
0.0508
0.2342
0.2813

0.3545
0.2415
-0.2830
0.3724
-0.6546
0.2257
0.5322
-0.2695

0.1275
0.0048
0.2351
-0.0585
0.0347
0.1353
-0.0951
-0.3145

Uniqueness
0.1734
0.2258
0.3972
0.2448
0.2130
0.1313
0.0873
0.4378

71
Factor analysis/correlation
Method: principal factors
Rotation: orthogonal varimax (Kaiser off)

Number of obs
=
Retained factors =
Number of params =

27
4
26

Factor

Variance

Difference

Proportion

Cumulative

Factor1
Factor2
Factor3
Factor4

2.33692
1.91197
1.62617
0.21434

0.42495
0.28580
1.41183
.

0.4102
0.3356
0.2854
0.0376

0.4102
0.7458
1.0312
1.0688

LR test: independent vs. saturated:

chi2(28) =

133.12 Prob>chi2 = 0.0000

Rotated factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances

Variable

Factor1

Factor2

Factor3

Factor4

nom_eer_2015
real_ee~2015
exports~2014
ir_bond~2015
labourc~2015
relativ~2015
pricele~2015
inflati~2015

-0.0873
0.0910
0.4084
-0.3923
-0.4292
0.8872
0.9395
0.3825

0.9033
0.8426
-0.4987
-0.0472
0.2547
-0.1957
0.1207
-0.1316

-0.0111
0.2262
0.3398
-0.7728
0.7333
0.1583
-0.0186
0.5469

-0.0536
0.0693
-0.2681
0.0423
-0.0163
-0.1348
0.1228
0.3154

Factor rotation matrix

Factor1
Factor2
Factor3
Factor4

Factor1

Factor2

Factor3

Factor4

0.8587
0.1467
0.4907
0.0184

-0.3875
0.8095
0.4330
0.0838

0.3350
0.5635
-0.7551
0.0068

-0.0145
0.0747
0.0403
-0.9963

Uniqueness
0.1734
0.2258
0.3972
0.2448
0.2130
0.1313
0.0873
0.4378
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Factor analysis/correlation
Method: principal factors
Rotation: (unrotated)

Number of obs
=
Retained factors =
Number of params =

26
5
28

Factor

Eigenvalue

Difference

Proportion

Cumulative

Factor1
Factor2
Factor3
Factor4
Factor5
Factor6
Factor7
Factor8

4.22311
1.88541
0.56826
0.40036
0.04739
-0.02175
-0.04133
-0.09673

2.33770
1.31715
0.16790
0.35298
0.06914
0.01958
0.05540
.

0.6064
0.2707
0.0816
0.0575
0.0068
-0.0031
-0.0059
-0.0139

0.6064
0.8771
0.9587
1.0161
1.0229
1.0198
1.0139
1.0000

LR test: independent vs. saturated:

chi2(28) =

211.42 Prob>chi2 = 0.0000

Factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances

Variable

Factor1

Factor2

Factor3

Factor4

Factor5

nom_eer_2005
real_ee~2005
exports~2005
ir_bond~2005
labourc~2005
relativ~2005
pricele~2005
inflati~2005

0.0392
0.6385
0.7213
-0.5858
0.8301
0.9076
0.9292
-0.7577

0.9692
0.7306
-0.1641
0.5441
-0.0534
-0.0299
0.1877
0.2247

0.0610
-0.1437
0.4471
0.0299
-0.3934
0.2794
0.1039
0.3155

-0.0792
0.0120
0.3327
0.3776
-0.0146
-0.1778
-0.0958
-0.3157

-0.0334
-0.0524
-0.0053
0.1105
0.1359
0.0696
-0.0055
0.0892

Uniqueness
0.0481
0.0351
0.1422
0.2051
0.1346
0.0609
0.0813
0.1682

73
Factor analysis/correlation
Method: principal factors
Rotation: orthogonal varimax (Kaiser off)

Number of obs
=
Retained factors =
Number of params =

26
5
28

Factor

Variance

Difference

Proportion

Cumulative

Factor1
Factor2
Factor3
Factor4
Factor5

2.00633
1.85023
1.81088
1.39368
0.06341

0.15610
0.03935
0.41720
1.33027
.

0.2881
0.2657
0.2600
0.2001
0.0091

0.2881
0.5537
0.8137
1.0138
1.0229

LR test: independent vs. saturated:

chi2(28) =

211.42 Prob>chi2 = 0.0000

Rotated factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances

Variable

Factor1

Factor2

Factor3

Factor4

Factor5

nom_eer_2005
real_ee~2005
exports~2005
ir_bond~2005
labourc~2005
relativ~2005
pricele~2005
inflati~2005

0.9478
0.8674
-0.0220
0.3191
0.1609
0.2115
0.4252
0.0452

-0.1744
0.3882
0.2431
-0.3029
0.7811
0.2833
0.4183
-0.8080

-0.0525
0.2130
0.8822
-0.2153
0.2180
0.6625
0.5631
-0.3666

-0.1404
0.1285
0.1351
-0.7424
0.3974
0.6002
0.4936
-0.1620

0.0281
-0.0004
-0.0404
0.0617
0.1548
0.1220
0.0455
0.1275

Factor rotation matrix

Factor1
Factor2
Factor3
Factor4
Factor5

Factor1

Factor2

Factor3

Factor4

Factor5

0.2544
0.9571
-0.0229
-0.1161
-0.0727

0.5921
-0.1290
-0.7152
0.3451
0.0473

0.5872
-0.0877
0.6974
0.3989
0.0443

0.4890
-0.2393
0.0399
-0.8277
-0.1302

0.0285
0.0490
0.0065
-0.1522
0.9867

Uniqueness
0.0481
0.0351
0.1422
0.2051
0.1346
0.0609
0.0813
0.1682
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Factor analysis/correlation
Method: principal factors
Rotation: (unrotated)

Number of obs
=
Retained factors =
Number of params =

239
7
63

Factor

Eigenvalue

Difference

Proportion

Cumulative

Factor1
Factor2
Factor3
Factor4
Factor5
Factor6
Factor7
Factor8
Factor9
Factor10
Factor11
Factor12

3.88245
2.64684
1.32836
0.77563
0.32236
0.11425
0.03747
-0.01730
-0.04353
-0.06062
-0.09541
-0.16848

1.23561
1.31847
0.55274
0.45326
0.20811
0.07678
0.05477
0.02623
0.01708
0.03480
0.07307
.

0.4451
0.3035
0.1523
0.0889
0.0370
0.0131
0.0043
-0.0020
-0.0050
-0.0069
-0.0109
-0.0193

0.4451
0.7486
0.9009
0.9898
1.0268
1.0399
1.0442
1.0422
1.0372
1.0303
1.0193
1.0000

LR test: independent vs. saturated:

chi2(66) = 2492.00 Prob>chi2 = 0.0000

Factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances

Variable

Factor1

Factor2

Factor3

Factor4

Factor5

Factor6

Factor7

per_hit~2015
per_kis_2015
per_man~2015
gfcf_2015
nom_eer_2015
real_ee~2015
exports~2014
ir_bond~2015
labourc~2015
relativ~2015
pricele~2015
inflati~2015

0.4162
0.8869
-0.5880
0.3057
0.4935
0.5355
-0.1274
-0.4512
-0.2935
0.7107
0.9282
0.5296

0.0706
-0.0203
0.3201
0.2185
-0.7872
-0.6788
0.6927
-0.5865
-0.0283
0.5662
0.0021
0.5154

0.2062
-0.0738
0.3286
-0.0131
0.2317
0.3837
0.0837
-0.5189
0.7912
-0.1767
-0.1032
0.1646

0.5960
0.2847
-0.1728
0.3253
-0.1410
-0.1657
-0.0260
0.1041
0.0988
-0.1888
-0.2672
-0.1672

0.1608
-0.1974
0.2890
0.2428
0.1450
0.0837
0.1250
0.0844
-0.1569
0.0682
0.1283
-0.1364

0.0705
-0.0016
0.0949
-0.0280
-0.0748
0.0740
-0.0647
0.0757
-0.0926
-0.1258
-0.0014
0.2326

0.0357
-0.0038
-0.0506
-0.0710
0.0192
0.0404
0.1473
0.0666
0.0083
0.0001
-0.0092
0.0172

Uniqueness
0.3919
0.0875
0.3189
0.6880
0.0362
0.0637
0.4547
0.1551
0.2440
0.0869
0.0398
0.3259
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Factor analysis/correlation
Method: principal factors
Rotation: orthogonal varimax (Kaiser off)

Number of obs
=
Retained factors =
Number of params =

239
7
63

Factor

Variance

Difference

Proportion

Cumulative

Factor1
Factor2
Factor3
Factor4
Factor5
Factor6
Factor7

2.94494
2.57762
1.25239
1.24480
0.90312
0.13531
0.04918

0.36732
1.32523
0.00760
0.34167
0.76781
0.08613
.

0.3376
0.2955
0.1436
0.1427
0.1035
0.0155
0.0056

0.3376
0.6332
0.7768
0.9195
1.0230
1.0385
1.0442

LR test: independent vs. saturated:

chi2(66) = 2492.00 Prob>chi2 = 0.0000

Rotated factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances

Variable

Factor1

Factor2

Factor3

Factor4

Factor5

Factor6

Factor7

per_hit~2015
per_kis_2015
per_man~2015
gfcf_2015
nom_eer_2015
real_ee~2015
exports~2014
ir_bond~2015
labourc~2015
relativ~2015
pricele~2015
inflati~2015

0.1581
0.4778
-0.0809
0.2353
-0.0549
0.0699
0.3634
-0.8061
-0.1023
0.8709
0.7073
0.7554

0.0997
0.3019
-0.3128
-0.0564
0.9656
0.9495
-0.5228
0.0576
0.0784
-0.0903
0.4962
-0.0672

0.1088
-0.1371
0.2757
-0.1034
-0.0272
0.0959
0.1041
-0.4155
0.8358
-0.3051
-0.3844
0.0464

0.2232
0.6702
-0.7049
0.0618
0.1400
0.1026
-0.2809
0.0300
-0.1979
0.1691
0.2450
0.0860

0.7144
0.3491
-0.0492
0.4733
0.0261
0.0477
0.0869
-0.1306
0.0387
0.0811
0.0735
0.0583

0.0269
0.0444
0.0300
-0.1140
-0.0862
0.0888
-0.0465
0.0032
0.0085
-0.1227
-0.0210
0.2927

0.0180
-0.0365
-0.0200
-0.0438
0.0063
-0.0031
0.2012
0.0338
0.0086
0.0560
0.0002
-0.0184

Factor rotation matrix

Factor1
Factor2
Factor3
Factor4
Factor5
Factor6
Factor7

Factor1

Factor2

Factor3

Factor4

Factor5

Factor6

Factor7

0.6806
0.6174
0.1859
-0.3432
0.0105
-0.0392
-0.0397

0.4738
-0.7552
0.3209
-0.2440
0.2041
0.0211
0.0231

-0.2195
0.0661
0.8596
0.1569
-0.3923
-0.1730
0.0017

0.4426
-0.1722
-0.3017
0.3973
-0.7026
-0.1726
0.0476

0.2607
0.1095
0.1633
0.7986
0.4814
0.1546
0.0079

0.0137
0.0152
0.0760
-0.0438
-0.2679
0.9355
0.2119

-0.0098
0.0471
-0.0046
-0.0248
0.0849
-0.1979
0.9750

Uniqueness
0.3919
0.0875
0.3189
0.6880
0.0362
0.0637
0.4547
0.1551
0.2440
0.0869
0.0398
0.3259
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